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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
The proper use of natural resources has probably been a subject of 
debate since man's earliest days. Questions of propriety depend on 
values which are likely to vary by individual. One person's wise use 
of a particular resource may be perceived as wasteful by another. 
Governments were formed in part to insure that consideration of common 
values was not overlooked by powerful individuals or groups. Differences 
between societal and private values have led at times to conflict between 
the public and private sectors in resource management. Pigou (102) 
framed the dilemma over fifty years ago when he wrote: 
It is the clear duty of Government, which is the trustee for 
unborn generations as well as for its present citizens, to 
watch over, and, if need be, by legislative enactment, to 
defend, the exhaustible natural resources of the country from 
rash and reckless spoliation. How far it should itself, 
either out of taxes, or out of state loans, or by the device 
of guaranteed interest, press resources into undertakings 
from which the business community, if left to itself, would 
hold aloof, is a more difficult problem. (pp. 29-30) 
In determining the role of government in resource management, two 
major questions arise: (1) How much should government invest in the 
resource? and (2) Where should the funds be invested? The issues are not 
completely separable since the extent of government involvement will 
partially determine where funds are spent and the efficiency with which 
monies are used will affect the level of investment (Heady, 66), Although 
Pigou's "difficult problem" focused only on the first question, the 
second is not a great deal more tractable. 
Current concerns regarding government investment in agricultural 
land revolve around the two issues of 'how much' and 'where'. 
2 
Investments in the soil resource have been defined as soil conservation 
(Bunce, 20). While such investments might include funding of erosion 
reduction practices, irrigation projects or even agricultural-related 
research, the subject is here restricted to include funding of erosion 
reduction measures only. The reasons for such investments are many and 
varied. Modem proponents of soil conservation seem to base their argu­
ments on such issues as resource adequacy, deteriorating environmental 
quality, excessive soil loss, and slowing rates of technological change. 
A brief examination of these arguments provides some understanding of 
why governments are involved in soil conservation as well as insight 
into some of the more important unresolved issues related to soil re­
source investments. 
Conservation Rationale 
America has been endowed with a great deal of productive land. 
Although the federal government owns approximately one-third of the 
2263 million acre land base, the most productive lands are predominantly 
privately held. Figure 1 provides a breakdown of the land base in 1977. 
Most of the nonfederal land is in rural settings and the majority of 
this rural land is classified as agricultural land. The 1361 million 
acres of agricultural land are supposedly all lands "currently used to 
produce agricultural commodities including forest products or lands that 
have the potential for such production" (USDA, 133, p. 21). Such a 
definition is not totally accurate since the classification fails to 
include 500 million acres of federal lands that are important con­
tributors to timber and livestock production (Brewer and Boxley, 16). 
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(Million acres) 
NONFEDERAL LAND 1,512 FEDERAL LAND 751 
TOTAL 
U.S. 
(2,263) 
RURAL LAND 1.443 
AGRICULTURAL LAND (1,361) 
69 
^ URBAN LAND 
NONFEDERAL LAND 
(1,512) 
X RURAL TRANSPORTATION 'S 
-A OTHER NONFARM 47 
WATERS 
82 
RURAL LAND (1,443) 
.PASTURELAND 
^ OTHER LAND IN FARM 
CROPLAND RANGELAND FOREST LAND 
413 414 376 133 AGRICULTURAL LAND 
(1.361) 
CROPLAND 
413 
^POTENTIAL CROPLAND HIGH AND MEDIUM POTENTIAL 127 FROM: PASTURELAND • 51.4 
RANGELAND - 38.9 
CROPLAND BASE (540) OÏHI^L^D 
PRIME FARMLAND (345) 
CROP USE (230) 
Figure 1. America's land base in 1977 (USDA, 133) 
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It also does not include land in urban areas that is used for agri­
cultural purposes (Raup, 107). While all agricultural lands are not 
important economically, much of the publicity related to land use and 
soil conservation fails to recognize this (USDA, 133; Brewer and Boxley, 
16; Raup, 107). 
A further division of the agricultural land class reveals 413 mil­
lion acres of cropland with a potential increase from range, forest 
and pasture lands of 127 million acres given 1977 price relationships 
and technologies. Approximately 380 million acres were planted to crops 
in 1980—about the same as in 1949 and greater than any year in between. 
Although controversy exists regarding the accuracy of this classifi­
cation scheme (Fischel, 52; Raup, 107; Brewer and Boxley, 16), it is 
sufficient for present purposes. Note that a substantial amount of crop­
land is used for other than cropping purposes and that unused and poten­
tial cropland provide a degree of insurance (Crosson, 39). Nevertheless, 
a debate regarding the adequacy of agricultural lands that has waxed and 
waned for centuries continues (Crosson, 40). It provides one of the 
major arguments for soil conservation—without conservation, it is 
argued that future productivity will be excessively impaired and agri­
cultural production will fall short of demand. 
Concern for the adequacy of pure water, open spaces and natural sur­
roundings also motivates conservation. Preservation of adequate agri­
cultural lands to meet production goals will be irrelevant if concern 
for the adequacy of these other resources is the issue. The fact that 
conservation may not be indicated on productivity grounds does not 
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negate the need on the basis of environmental quality and vice versa. 
Several other issues contribute to the present concern for soil 
conservation. Since the early 1970s, agricultural exports have become 
increasingly important to the United States. Crop shortfalls abroad 
coupled with rising incomes and Soviet desires to upgrade diets dimin­
ished U.S. grain surpluses and reduced the need for governmental price 
supports. The balance of payments problems caused by increased oil 
prices were offset largely by agriculture. The government found itself 
advocating fencerow to fencerow planting. Marginal lands were put under 
more intensive cultivation to meet the increased demand. In the rush 
to expand production, some felt the soil resource was being used unwise­
ly (being exported with the crops) and more widespread use of conserva­
tion measures was needed (Timmons and Amos, 125). However, a world­
wide economic recession in the early 1980s dampened demand. This, 
coupled with recent record harvests, led to a return to supply manage­
ment by government. Acreage diversion programs (paid diversion, payment 
in kind) are expected to substantially decrease cultivation of marginal 
and other lands in 1983. Although marginal lands are being retired, 
concerns regarding the exportation of soil remain. It is unclear whether 
the present is an aberration from the pattern of the 1970s or a new trend. 
There is still a concern, even in the absence of increased exports, 
that land use practices of modem agriculture lead to excessive erosion 
(Congress of the U.S., 34). The large equipment used compacts the soil 
and has led farmers to remove fences, windbreaks, terraces and other 
conservation structures. The resulting long straight rows coupled with 
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limited cropping changes (monocultures) exacerbate soil loss. 
In addition to the issues of resource adequacy and the proper use 
of soil, doubts are raised regarding future rates of technological 
change in agriculture. Changes in productivity and crop yields due 
to hybrids, better equipment, and managerial skills have offset reduc­
tions in productivity due to erosion in the past (see Walker and Young 
(138) for a dissenting view). Whether this will continue to be the 
case is, of course, unknown. It is argued that productivity grew at 
slower rates from 1972-1979 than from 1950-1972 (Crosson, 40). At the 
same time, it is argued that there is no statistical evidence of a 
decline in productivity growth for the 1970-1979 period (Heady, 64). 
The growth rate is important. Crosson (40) found that estimates of the 
amount of land needed to meet projected demands for grain and soybeans 
in 2005 varied greatly depending on the rate of growth in yields. Growth 
at a 2% annual rate would require 237 million acres while 310 million 
acres would be required at 1%. An argument for either rate can be made 
though more weight is usually given to the lower number in projections. 
It can be argued then that investments in the soil resource (or 
conservation) are justified to maintain its productive capacity and 
insure the adequacy of other resources. The appropriate level of in­
vestment requires a determination of the amount of the resource to be 
used now and how much to leave for future use—Pigou's problem posed 
earlier. It also depends on the efficiency with which such investments 
preserve the various resources. The costs of soil investments are 
usually known (at least approximately since opportunity costs may be 
7 
hard to define). The benefits are less quantifiable. Often, the bene­
fits are assumed to be very large so that conservation is promoted at 
any cost. It is likely, however, that costs exceed benefits beyond 
some level of conservation. This implies that an optimal amount of 
conservation exists. It is sometimes argued that farmers fail to supply 
such an optimal quantity. If such is the case, the government can 
expect to be called upon to make up the deficiency. 
Objectives 
The major issues associated with soil conservation involve the 
determination of the role of government, determination of the optimal 
amount of conservation, determination of efficient practices, and 
accurate measurement of conservation benefits. These areas of inquiry 
are pursued in this research. The specific objectives of the study are: 
(1) To explain why governmental investment in soil conservation 
may be desired; 
(2) To develop an economic model of soil use that can provide 
optimal decision rules for producers and policy makers; 
(3) To estimate the benefits of soil conservation from both 
private and social points of view for different soils and 
locations in Iowa and the Corn Belt; 
(4) To determine the effect of soil characteristics on the deci­
sion to adopt a particular conservation practice; 
(5) To derive the implications for improving government soil 
conservation policy arising from objectives (3) and (4). 
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While arguments for government conservation efforts will hopefully 
be clarified, the determination of conservation benefits may be the 
most significant result of the research. The process used places a 
value on the soil resource. Since measures of both private and social 
values are obtained, valuation of externalities is also performed. 
Current policy debates are stymied by a lack of such information. A 
knowledge of the value or price of particular soils will allow research­
ers to quantify benefits of soil-related research and thereby determine 
project priorities. Such prices could also aid in efficient policy 
development and program management. 
The analysis should also show how results of government soil con­
servation programs have changed over time and whether such changes have 
or have not been beneficial. Such information can greatly aid future 
expenditures on soil conservation by increasing the efficiency with 
which such funds are used. The ability to predict the probability of 
adoption of a practice by a farmer on the basis of land attributes would 
also be useful in improving government policy. 
Organization 
Chapter II provides an overview of the soil resource—how it is 
described, how it changes, the state of knowledge regarding rates of 
change, and the effects of such changes on productivity. The concept 
of soil conservation is also discussed. 
Chapter III briefly traces the theory of welfare economics. The 
economic basis for social choice using efficiency criteria is discussed 
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and applied to soil use. Possible justifications for government invest­
ment in the soil resource are also discussed. Past conservation programs 
are reviewed and present policy proposals are examined. 
In Chapter IV, a micro theoretical model is developed to examine 
soil resource allocation. Optimal decision rules are derived and the 
implications for soil values given soil-saving investments are pre­
sented. It is shown that information necessary to value soils can be 
obtained using the assumption of rationality and currently available 
data. 
Chapter V describes the data base, the data analysis and the re­
sults of the soil valuation process. Statistical tests are performed 
to determine sources of significant differences in conservation bene­
fits. The policy implications of the results are also presented. 
The effect of soil characteristics on soil conservation practice 
adoption is modeled in Chapter VI. A multinomial logit procedure is 
used to estimate adoption rates of four conservation practices. The 
results and their policy relevance are discussed. 
Chapter VI contains a brief summary of the research and conclusions. 
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CHAPTER II. THE SOIL RESOURCE 
Resources are often classified as being either renewable or non­
renewable. Soil is not easily placed in such a classification system 
since it is actually a composite of many other resources (Timmons, 124; 
Schumm and Harvey, 115; Ciriacy-Wantrup, 26). This composite includes 
nutrients, other chemicals, water, many species of plants and animals, 
site and other physical conditions. The use of the composite resource 
may be measured in several ways. The displacement of the resource may 
be viewed as a use since the same physical unit is no longer available 
for other purposes. Alternatively, use may also be measured in terms 
of the flow of benefits or the foreclosing of such a flow (opportunity 
costs associated with paving over, building on, or flooding of the soil). 
The flow of agricultural benefits from a given plot of soil is referred 
to as soil productivity and is affected not only by water, nutrients, 
organic matter, other chemical properties and physical properties but 
also by climate, management, equipment and the genetic potential of 
crops grown. Soils and/or soil productivity are renewable in the sense 
that soils form over time and can sustain production for many years. 
Productivity may be compensated for to the extent that technology in­
creases the yields obtainable from a given plot. Productivity is non­
renewable for a given soil if erosion or usage exhausts or permanently 
halts the productive potential. Conservation may refer either to the 
saving of the soil or the soil's productivity. This chapter briefly 
reviews the state of knowledge regarding soil, rates of change 
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associated with soils and soil productivity, and alternative definitions 
of conservation. 
Soil Classification 
A soil's suitability for agricultural purposes has been expressed in 
terms of capability classes and subclasses based on limitations to the 
production of crops. These classes are: 
Soils with few limitations restricting their use. 
Soils with moderate limitations restricting their use. 
Soils with severe limitations restricting their use. 
Soils with very severe limitations restricting their 
use. 
Soils that are not likely to erode but that have other 
limitations, which are impractical to remove, restrict­
ing their use. 
Soils with severe limitations that make them generally 
unsuitable for cultivation. 
Soils with very severe limitations that make them un­
suitable for cultivation. 
Class VIII : Soils and landforms with limitations that nearly pre­
clude their use for commercial crop production. 
The distribution of cropland by region and land capability class 
is shown in Table 1. 
Class I: 
Class II: 
Class III: 
Class IV: 
Class V: 
Class VI: 
Class VII: 
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Table 1. Cropland acreage, 1975, by region and capability classes 
(Swader, 123) 
Millions of acres 
Farm Total Classes I-III Class IV Classes V-VIII production crop­
region land Acres % Acres % Acres % 
Northeast 17.3 14 81 2.0 12 1.3 7 
Lake States 44.2 39 88 3.7 8 1.5 4 
Com Belt 86.3 80 93 4.7 5 1.6 2 
Northern Plains 91.2 78 86 9.0 10 4.2 4 
Appalachian 20.7 18 87 1.4 7 1.3 6 
Southeast 16.3 13 80 2.7 17 0.6 3 
Delta States 20.5 19 93 0.6 3 0.9 4 
Southern Plains 40.9 36 88 3.4 8 1.5 4 
Mountain 40.1 30 75 7.8 19 2.3 6 
Pacific 22.1 17 76 4.3 19 1.0 5 
AK, HK, PR, VI 0.7 0.4 57 0.1 14 0.2 28 
440.5 344.4 73.0 16.4 
Changes in the Soil Resource 
Changes in the soil resource alter both the quantity and the quality 
of the remaining soil. There is agreement that soil formation and ero­
sion occur naturally and that man can and has affected both (Hall et 
al., 59). However, the rates at which such changes occur and their 
effects are subjects of considerable dispute. 
Formation 
Soil genesis or the formation of new soil occurs through the process 
of weathering of parent rock and/or the renewal of existing soil through 
accumulation, deposition, or structural changes (Hall et al., 59). 
Formation rates of .15, 1.5 and even 5 tons per acre per year are cited 
in the literature but are not founded on a rigorous scientific base 
13 
(Pimentai et al., 103; Hall et al., 59). Actual rates depend on the 
parent material and other factors affecting use. Normal agricultural 
practices are thought to form soil at .5 to 1.5 tons per acre per year 
(Schumm and Harvey, 115). Although topsoil may form at these rates, 
there is increasing concern that subsoil formation is much slower 
(Congress of the U.S., 34). 
Erosion 
Soil erosion or the wearing away of the soil surface can be 
classified as either wind, sheet and rill, gully or streambank erosion 
depending on the nature of the erosive process. Wind erosion is 
important in the Great Plains and may account for as much as 1/4 of all 
erosion nationwide (Pimentai et al., 103). However, sheet and rill ero­
sion is responsible for the majority of soil loss. Sheet erosion removes 
a thin layer of soil through rainfall and runoff action. Rill erosion 
occurs when runoff water creates small channels and soil from the channel 
beds is removed. These 'rills' are smoothed in normal tillage opera­
tions. When the channels impede normal operations and can no longer be 
covered, gully erosion takes place. Streambank erosion is usually not 
under a farmer's control and will not be considered below. Estimates 
of the amount of erosion caused by these processes are shown in Table 2. 
Measurement of erosion Measurement of erosion is necessary to 
determine its effects and to chart the progress of erosion reduction 
efforts. The Universal Soil Loss Equation (USLE) has been developed to 
predict sheet and rill erosion based on soil characteristics and 
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Table 2. Gross annual erosion on nonfederal land in the United States, 
1977 (USDA, 126) 
Sheet, rill, and wind ero- Total 
sion on agricultural land acre- Total 
— tl 5:13:9 lîT age it. ero-
tons/ tons/ tons/ tons/ land sion 
acre acre acre acre use 
Cropland 
Pastureland 
Forest land 
Rangeland 
Total sheet, rill, and 
wind erosion 
(millions 
of acres) 
158.6 113.6 93.1 
105.0 14.0 9.5 
327.0 26.0 11.7 
283.5 55.5 40.1 
(billions 
of tons) 
48.0 413. 3 2.82 
4.0 133. 6 0.35 
4.9 369. 7 0.44 
28.8 407. 9 1.71 
5.32 
Total erosion on 
streambanks, gullies, 
roads and roadsides, 
and construction sites — — — — — 1.10 
Total 874.1 209.1 154.4 86.7 1324.5 6.42 
management practices (Wischmeier and Smith, 141). The equation is; 
A = EKLSCP 
where each letter represents a variable. 
A is the predicted average annual soil loss in tons per acre for a 
given area. R is a rainfall and runoff value measuring the suscepti­
bility of the soil to erosion from moving water. K is the soil erodi-
bility value. K-values have been determined for all soils based on soil 
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characteristics affecting erodibility. L is a slope length factor. 
Slope length is the distance from the point of origin of overland flow 
to the point where (a) the slope decreases and deposition begins, or 
(b) runoff enters a well-defined channel. The factor is the ratio of 
soil loss from a specific length of slope to that from the length speci­
fied for the K-value. S is a steepness of slope factor. It is the ratio 
of soil loss from the field slope gradient to that from a standard slope 
under otherwise identical conditions. 
The product of R, K, L, and S is an estimate of the average gross 
soil loss from a tilled continuously fallow field on a given soil. 
Losses increase as rainfall, slope length, steepness and inherent 
erosivity increase. C is a cover and management factor. It is the ex­
pected ratio of soil lost from land cropped under specified conditions 
to that lost from continuously cultivated fallow land with identical 
soil, slope, and rainfall conditions. This value adjusts gross erosion 
for influences of crops, crop rotations, and other management consider­
ations. P is an erosion control practice factor. It is the ratio of 
soil loss under a specified conservation practice to that with uphill 
and downhill farming operations under equivalent conditions. It adjusts 
gross soil loss to account for actions reducing the velocity of runoff. 
Wind erosion is estimated from an equation similar to the USLE al­
though the estimation is valid only in the Great Plains region 
(Skidmore and Woodruff, 118). The equation may be written as 
E = FCIKCVL) 
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E is the potential annual soil loss in tons per acre per year. F 
denotes a function. I is the soil erodibility value expressed as the 
average annual soil loss per acre that would occur from an isolated, 
level, smooth, unsheltered wide, and bare field with a noncrusted 
surface at Garden City, Kansas. K is the soil ridge roughness value. 
C is the climatic value which is based on the average wind velocity 
and the precipitation-evaporation index for a given location. V is the 
vegetative cover value which accounts for the quantity, kind, and 
orientation of residue. L is the unsheltered distance across a field 
along the prevailing wind direction. 
The amount of erosion estimated to occur in the U.S. in 1977, and 
its distribution can be ascertained from Tables 2, 3 and 4. Table 2 
shows the amount of the different types of erosion by land use and ero­
sion rate. Table 3 shows the number of acres of cropland eroding by 
erosion rate and the cumulative percentage of erosion at each rate. 
Only sheet and rill erosion estimates are included in this table. While 
77% of the nation's cropland erodes at less than 5 tons per acre per 
year, just under 9% erodes at rates greater than 10 tons per acre per 
year. However, this 9% of the cropland accounts for over half of all 
sheet and rill erosion. Table 4 presents a geographical breakdown of 
erosion. It is evident from data in this table that the Com Belt, 
Appalachia, the Southeast and the Southern Plains have more than their 
share of erosion problems. 
Despite the straightforward nature of the formulas and statistics, 
broad areas of ignorance with respect to soil loss measurement remain 
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Table 3. Annual sheet and rill erosion on cropland and the amount of 
erosion in excess of 5 tons per acre, by erosion rate, 1977 
(USDA, 129) 
Total Cumulative 
Total erosion percentage 
Annual 
TotiâX Cumulative sheet Cumulative in ex­ of erosion 
erosion percentage and percentage cess of in excess 
rate of acreage rill of erosion 5 tons of 5 tons 
erosion per acre per acre 
(tons per (mil­ (millions (millions 
acre) lions) of tons) of tons) 
0-1 131.6 31.8 49.2 2.6 0.0 0.0 
1-2 74.6 49.8 110.6 8.3 0.0 0.0 
2-3 51.5 62.3 127.5 14.9 0.0 0.0 
3-4 35.9 71.0 125.0 21.4 0.0 0.0 
4-5 26.0 77.3 116.3 27.4 0.0 0.0 
5-6 17.6 81.6 96.2 32.4 8.2 0.9 
6-7 12.6 84.6 81.8 36.6 18.6 2.9 
7-8 9.3 86.9 69.4 40.2 23.0 5.4 
8-9 7.3 88.7 62.0 43.4 25.4 8.1 
9-10 5.8 90.1 54.6 46.2 25.8 10.9 
10-11 4.8 91.3 50.2 48,8 26.3 13.7 
11-12 3.7 92.2 43.1 51.0 24.4 16.3 
12-13 3.0 92.9 36.9 52.9 22.1 18.7 
13-14 2.8 93.6 37.1 54.8 23.3 21.2 
14-15 2.4 94.2 34.6 56.6 22.7 23.6 
15-20 7.8 96.1 134.8 63.6 95.8 33.9 
20-25 4.4 97.1 98.0 68.7 76.0 42.1 
25-30 2.9 97.8 80.6 72.9 65.8 49.2 
30-50 5.5 99.1 209.9 83.8 182.4 68.8 
50-75 2.3 99.6 133.8 90.7 122.5 82.0 
75-100 0.8 99.8 64.4 94.0 60.6 88.5 
100+ 0.7 100.0 109.8 100.0 106.3 100.0 
Total 413.3 1925.8 929.2 
Table 4. Erosion from cropland in the United States in 1977 (USDA, 126) 
Region Wind (million 
tons) 
Sheet and 
rill 
(million 
tons) 
Excess 
erosion 
(1000 
acres) 
Total erosion 
(million tons/ 
tons) acre 
Percent 
total 
Crop­
land 
of 
Ero­
sion 
Excess 
erosion 
Nation 891 1908 93779 2799 6.8 ICQ 100 100 
Northeast 
a 
n.e. 82.9 4204 82.9 5.0 4.0 3.0 4.4 
Lake States n.e. 117.5 5637 117.5 2.7 10.7 4.2 6.0 
Com Belt n.e. 688.3 33209 688.3 7.7 21.8 24.6 35.4 
Iowa n.e. 261.3 11979 261.3 9.9 6.4 9.3 12.8 
Northern Plains 212.3 322.4 13954 534.7 5.6 22.9 19.1 14.9 
Appalachia n.e. 186.3 8121 186.3 9.0 5.0 6.7 8.7 
Southeast n.e. 111.0 6927 111.0 6.3 4.2 4.0 7.4 
Delta n.e. 154.9 9007 154.9 7.3 5.1 5.5 9.6 
Southern Plains 488.8 141.4 7999 630.2 15.0 10.2 22.5 8.5 
Mountain 190.3 70.8 2847 261.1 6.2 10.2 9.3 3.0 
Pacific n.e. 31.9 1534 31.9 1.4 5.6 1.1 1.6 
^n.e. - not estimated. 
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(Robinson, 110). One Is led to believe that 6.5 billion tons of 
soil disappear annually—2.8 billion of it from cropland. This Impres­
sion Is reinforced In some of the conservation literature (Sampson, 
111; McLaughlin, 88; Barlow, 8). Actually, the USLE only predicts 
erosion along the length of a slope to a point of deposition. The 
amount that eventually leaves a field varies widely. Most of the 
sheet and rill soil erosion remains in the same field just further 
down the slope. Wind erosion has comparable effects (Cook, 37; 
Robinson, 110). While 40% of all sediment is attributed to cropland, 
the amount of soil movement as calculated by the USLE which actually 
leaves the farm depends on the watershed, soil type and land topography 
and may be less than 1% or as high as 55% of the estimated gross soil 
"loss" (Larson et al., 77; Robinson, 110). 
Trend 
The trend in soil erosion over time is usually assumed to be upward 
so that there is more erosion now than ever before (Sampson, 111; 
Pimentai et al., 103). However, recent studies have called this assump­
tion into question. Mayer (84) compared erosion studies from 1934 and 
1977 and found that in 1934 erosion was slight on 47% of the cropland, 
moderate on 38% and severe on 15%. The comparable numbers in 1977 were 
77%, 13%, and 10%. He concluded that soil resources improved greatly 
over the last 50 years. Schultz (113) argues that increases in yields 
and relocation of crop production activities have reduced erosion associ­
ated with most row crops. He also suggests that increases in exports 
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need not increase soil erosion. Even USDA soil science technicians have 
been surprised to discover soil loss rates substantially below antici­
pated levels (Cook, 35). The prevailing wisdom seems to be founded 
more on opinions than facts. The lack of intertemporal studies has 
hindered comparisons over time. However, the 1982 NRI will provide 
data in the near future lAich can be compared to that of 1977 to assess 
trend over this period. 
Productivity Effects 
Soil erosion (and formation) affect soil productivity. Erosion re­
duces productivity by inducing loss of nutrients, organic matter, water 
retention capacity, and rooting zone depth (Congress of the U.S., 34; 
Williams et al., 140). It is possible for erosion to have positive pro­
ductivity effects to the extent that deposition enriches the receiving 
soil. If subsoils are more productive than topsoils, then further 
positive productivity impacts occur (Crosson, 38). While soil forma­
tion usually has positive effects, such is not always the case (Hall 
et al., 59). The magnitude of these productivity effects is not yet 
known, though a number of studies have found a range of local effects. 
Williams et al. (140) cite studies showing that grain yields in the 
eastern U.S. declined 30-40% when the A horizon was eroded away; grain 
yields in Wisconsin and Minnesota were 25-35% less on severely eroded 
soils. Wheat yields in the Northwest were reduced 60% on desurfaced 
plots. Some of these same studies suggested that productivity could be 
restored if sufficient water, mulch and fertilizer were applied 
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(Williams et al., 140). The problem with much of this research is that 
it is dated. Also, most research was conducted at low crop production 
levels which cannot be extrapolated to current high levels. Addition­
ally, the studies indicate erosion impacts on productivity where ero­
sion is drastic; i.e., little or no top soil is left. Impacts are 
likely not the same for normal erosive processes where reduction in soil 
quality is gradual. 
A recent effort at USDA to predict effects of erosion on yields 
assumed a 1% growth rate in yields due to technological change and con­
tinued erosion at 1977 levels (Swader, 123). The estimated effects of 
erosion on yields for several crops in several areas at the end of a 
fifty year period are shown in Table 5. Overall, yields would be 8% 
less than they would otherwise have been. 
Attempts to relate soil characteristics to yields then show how 
yields change as erosion alters characteristics have also been under­
taken (Larson et al., 77; Pierce et al., 101). The effect of 1977 
erosion rates on yields over the next 50 to 100 years was examined for 
a number of major land resource areas (MLRAs). The areas studied in­
cluded western Iowa, the Iowa-Missouri border and southeastern Minnesota. 
With technology, management and factors other than erosion assumed con­
stant, yield losses ranged from 3 to 7% overall. Productivity losses on 
the steeper slopes were as high as 25%. 
Significant model refinements remain to be made and uncertainty re­
quires the accuracy of the estimates derived to be accepted with some 
reservation. Nevertheless, these efforts coupled with those of USDA's 
Table 5. Expected changes in yields of selected crops in selected areas if 1977 erosion 
rates continue for the next 50 years (Swader, 123) 
1977 50 Maximum Yield in Percentage 
soil year poten­ 2030 if of maximum 
Crop Producing Soil loss cumula­ Present tial present in 
area group rate 
(tons/ 
tive 
loss 
yield yield 
in 2030 
erosion 
continues 
2030 
acre) (inches) (bu/acre) (bu/acre) (bu/acre) (%) 
Com Pennsylvania and 1 2.5 0.8 101 152 152 100 
New York 2 5.5 1.8 81 121 120 99 
3 8.1 2.7 74 111 107 96 
4 9.2 3.1 66 99 91 92 
5 13.6 4.5 67 101 94 93 
Com Illinois and Ohio 1 3.9 1.3 105 157 156 99 
2 4.1 1.4 87 131 128 98 
3 13.2 4.4 76 113 97 86 
4 25.4 8.5 66 99 60 61 
5 42.4 14,1 61 92 50 54 
Corn Illinois and 1 4.0 1.3 91 137 137 100 
Missouri 2 5.1 1.7 74 111 110 99 
3 18.5 6.2 71 107 90 84 
4 14.7 4.9 62 93 76 82 
5 31.5 10.5 50 75 53 71 
Soybeans Iowa 1 3.2 1.0 34 51 51 100 
2 4.9 1.6 29 44 43 98 
3 16.6 5.6 26 39 33 85 
4 18.0 6.0 23 35 21 59 
5 32.2 10.7 20 30 24 79 
Soybeans South Carolina 1 3.2 1.1 24 36 36 100 
and Georgia 2 6.2 2.1 20 30 29 99 
3 15.7 5.2 17 25 21 82 
4 22.2 7.4 14 22 12 56 
5 17.4 5.8 12 18 16 93 
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erosion-productivity committee will hopefully lead to a greater under­
standing of the problems and provide answers useful in improving con­
servation policy. 
Despite the absence of solid information, USDA has attempted to 
determine how much erosion could be allowed without affecting produc­
tivity (see McCormack et al., 86, for a history of such efforts). The 
tolerance level or T value is defined as the maximum rate of annual 
soil erosion which permits a high level of productivity to be maintained 
economically and indefinitely (USDA, 126). Although such a rate could 
be expected to vary by soil, it is usually considered to be five tons per 
acre per year. Estimates must be considered crude approximations since 
little research exists to support them (Congress of the U.S., 34; 
Williams et al., 140). Early research, though sketchy, suggested that 
the top layer of soil (the A horizon) formed at 5 tons per acre per 
year and that gully erosion began at this rate. Both assertions are 
doubtful in light of present knowledge (Hall et al., 59). The A horizon 
might be maintained indefinitely but since it forms in the remaining soil 
(a replacement process), the soil can become thinner even at T value 
loss rates. On such soils, the maintenance of a favorable rooting zone 
would be more important than maintenance of the A horizon. If mainte­
nance of a favorable rooting zone is the goal, then many deep soils can 
tolerate much larger losses than 5 tons per acre per year (Logan, 82). 
Soil erosion rates alone are obviously not good indicators of damage to 
soil productivity (Larson et al., 77). 
Although it is usually accepted that regeneration is less than 
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T-values and that T-values are less than current erosion rates of many 
lands (Logan, 82), only erosion in excess of T is considered excessive. 
Whether this will reduce long-term productivity is not obvious due to 
aspects of soil quality and technological change. However, one might 
ask why erosion control practices are used on lands eroding at less than 
T values if long-term productivity is not being impaired (Cook, 37). 
Using the concept of T-values as benchmarks. Tables 3 and 4 show 
that excess erosion tends to be concentrated with 3% of soils account­
ing for nearly 60% of the excess erosion (USDA, 126). The Com Belt, 
Southeast, and Delta regions are the areas with the greatest concentrated 
erosion problems. 
Erosion produces offsite as well as onsite productivity effects in 
the form of increased drainage maintenance and water purification costs, 
reduced capacities of reservoirs and waterways, damages caused by sedi­
ment to bridges, ships, treatment plants, pumps, etc.; and impacts on 
fish, wildlife and recreational demands. Estimates of the magnitude of 
such costs are not easily derived. Linking costs to agricultural land 
is even more tenuous. Pimentai et al. (103) cite the following estimates 
of total sediment related costs: $250 million for dredging rivers and 
harbors; $50 million in value of lost reservoir capacity; $200 million 
for other sediment related damages. Crosson and Brubaker (41) calculated 
such costs to be equivalent to approximately $1 billion in 1980 dollars. 
A recent study in the state of Michigan found that elimination of 
most of the sediment from waterways in that state would not generate 
large cost savings from dredging and water treatment—$40,000 annual 
25 
water treatment savings and $13 million from dredging (Birch, 14). 
Further research in this area is warranted but whatever the results, 
they must be compared with the cost of the alternatives, i.e. soil 
erosion control. It may well be that some offsite costs can be borne 
more easily than the costs of preventing erosion in the first place. 
Soil Conservation 
Soil conservation is invariably viewed as a good—more is preferred 
to less—even though exactly what it is does not appear to be a subject 
of wide agreement. A relatively simple definition used above equated 
conservation to investment in the soil resource. An alternative, equally 
simple definition would define soil conservation as the slowing or 
halting of erosion. Any practice reducing the inherent erodibility of 
a soil in its natural state could be considered conserving. Alterna­
tively, one might view erodibility under current cropping and management 
practices as the basis for comparison (USLE). Conservation occurs when 
the use of alternative systems (as noted by changes in the C and P 
factors of the USLE) result in less gross erosion. The basis for com­
parison determines what is conserving and what is not. 
Ciriacy-Wantrup (26) defined conservation as the redistribution of 
use in the direction of the future. With respect to soil, this would 
imply that any practice which led to a greater amount of soil being 
available in future periods would be conserving. A comparison of at 
least two usage patterns is necessary although nonuse is not considered 
an option. 
Heady (67) proposed a definition that is more restrictive than 
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those above. Conservation is defined as the prevention of future pro­
ductivity losses on a unit of soil given fixed labor and capital inputs. 
Here, the effect of soil characteristics on productivity must remain 
unaltered. Erosion can occur as long as the productivity (present or 
future) of the soil is not affected (given other inputs). If use 
changes productivity, then conservation practices must restore it. 
Thus, terraces, crop rotations, minimum tillage, stripcropping and other 
farming practices which build or keep soil in place are conserving. This 
definition does not require comparisons among use rates but information 
about soil productivity and its interactions with cropping, cultivation 
and management systems. 
A fourth definition is implied by Brubaker and Castle (19). Since 
the productive capacity is important, modification in the form of the 
capacity may not be as important as maintenance of it. Conservation 
occurs as technology offsets land losses and overall productivity is 
unimpaired. Conservation thus might mean the using of one resource for 
another. Technological change leads to the substitution of labor and 
capital for land. Less land area is farmed more intensively by using 
more labor and capital. The focus on productive capacity implies that 
policies which are demand decreasing or which enhance productive capacity 
abroad can be soil conserving. There is of course a limit to the amount 
of soil one would wish to lose due to uncertainty. 
Depending on the definition used and/or the basis of comparison 
involved, a particular practice or technique may or may not be soil 
conserving. The environmentalist might view the natural state as 
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optimal and the basis for comparison. Rates of soil loss induced by 
man would have to be smaller than the sum of natural loss and gross 
soil formation rates. At the other extreme, anything which maintains 
productivity could be viewed as soil conserving. Investments in human 
capital, technology, seed research, production abroad and a number of 
other factors would be conserving. 
The most often-used definition of soil conservation, and the one 
which will be used in this study, refers to the soil saved by a reduc­
tion in present erosion levels. If erosion exceeds T-values, then any 
practice reducing erosion involves soil conservation. If used as a 
basis for policy, these definitions still allow for a wide range of 
alternative investments and/or practices. Although soil conservation 
and erosion control are not quite synonymous, they are used interchange­
ably below. 
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CHAPTER III. ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY AND SOCIAL CHOICE 
The role of government in society has probably never been clear 
cut. A brief perusal of American history reveals a number of conflicts 
based on differing ideas as to proper use of governmental powers. The 
first immigrants arrived because a government was perceived to be overly 
involved in religious affairs. The Revolution occurred when the onus of 
government became too excessive. The Civil War was fought by factions 
having differing views as to what constituted legitimate government 
duties. Today, a myriad of government programs and efforts that began as 
responses to Depression era problems have come under fire. The political 
problem for both the administration and the Congress is to determine what 
level of government intervention is acceptable. 
The major justification of government programs is described in the 
preamble of the constitution wherein society takes collective action in 
order to "establish justice, insure domestic tranquility, and promote the 
general welfare" among other things. Recent attempts to circumscribe 
government powers rely on arguments that excessive use of such action is 
leading to erosion of freedom (Friedman and Friedman, 54) or that past 
programs failed to increase the social welfare. It is argued that 
government has slowed growth, decreased productivity, and stifled 
progress (Gilder, 56). 
What should government do? The question is not easily answered al­
though economists have tried. The criteria, strengths, and weaknesses 
of the economic approach to social choice are briefly outlined in this 
chapter. The concepts discussed are applied to soil conservation in an 
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attempt to determine what governments should do in this case. Past 
governmental actions are reviewed and proposals presently being con­
sidered are examined in light of the social choice criteria developed. 
Economics and the Social Optima 
Welfare economics evaluates the desirability of alternative social 
states. The differing institutions and resource allocation patterns 
arising from various states cause differences in economic choices. 
Whether a change from one state to another is desirable or not depends on 
perceptions of welfare changes. If everyone can be made better off or 
if anyone can be made better off without anyone being made worse off, a 
change is desirable. This is the definition of pareto optimality—the 
efficiency criterion of welfare economics. 
Pareto optimality can apply to production, to consumption and to the 
economy as a whole. Each of these three levels of efficiency is briefly 
discussed below in the context of a two factor (X^ , Xg), two good (Y^ , 
Yg), two consumer world. 
Production efficiency 
Production is pareto optimal when an increase in the output of one 
product requires a decrease in the output of the other. Let the produc­
tion processes be represented by the functions Y^ = F^(X^^, Xg^), 
Y2 = 2^7}' ^^ th fixed input quantities, the problem is formu­
lated as maximization of 
L . + iiCïJ - "22» + *2«; " ^11 " >'l2> 
+ *3(X5 - X21 - X22) . (1) 
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First order conditions imply that 
9Fi/3Xii BFg/SXig 
(2) 
3F]/9X2i - BFg/BXgg 
That is, the marginal rate of substitution of X^  for Xg must be equal 
in the production of both goods. In addition, production must occur 
along the production possibility frontier (Y® - ^ 2 ^ 1^2' ^ 22^  ~ 0)- All 
points on the frontier are efficient in the sense that increasing pro­
duction of one good requires decreasing production of the other. No 
reallocation of inputs will yield a greater quantity of one without 
decreasing the other. Points inside the frontier are not efficient 
since the same amount of X^ and Xg could produce more of either or 
Yg or both. 
Consumption efficiency 
Pareto optimality in consumption requires that each consumer's 
utility be at a maximum given every other individual's utility. A 
reallocation would result in at least one person being made worse off. 
Let U^(Y^^, Yg^ ), 2^2^  utility functions of the two 
individuals where Y° = Y^  ^+ Y^ »^ and Y° = Y^  ^+ ^22' the 
utility of individual 1 subject to a constraint on the utility of 
individual 2 Ug = Ug, 
(3) 
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Evaluation of first order conditions yields 
9V2/3Y12 
(4) 
The marginal rate of substitution of for Yg must be the same for all 
consumers and consumption must be along the utility possibility fron-
Economy wide efficiency 
For an entire economy, an infinite number of utility possibility 
frontiers exist. The envelope of all such curves is termed the grand 
utility possibility curve. Along this frontier, it is impossible to 
U^ . The locus of overall pareto optimal points can be defined by 
maximizing ^£1^ subject to 2^2^ ' ^ 1 ~ ^ 11 ^12' 
Yg = ^ 2V ^22' ^1 ~ X^ , Xg). The last three equations 
describe the production possibilities curve and may be combined in 
implicit form to yield 
tier (U° - UgfY^ g, Y^g) = 0). 
modify production and/or consumption to increase without decreasing 
h(Y^, Yg) = 0 (5) 
The lagrangian function is 
The first order conditions are manipulated to yield 
3Ui/8Yii SUg/aY^^g 3h/9Y. 1 9Y, 2 (7) 
2 1 
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That is, the marginal rate of substitution in consumption between two 
goods is the same across all consumers and equal to the marginal rate 
of transformation between the two goods. These results can be general­
ized to n goods, m consumers and s inputs (Henderson and Quandt, 68). 
There are still an infinite number of pareto efficient points with 
no way to distinguish which is best. Indeed, even points inside the 
grand utility possibility frontier may be superior to an "efficient" 
point. Pareto efficient production and consumption are necessary but 
not sufficient for welfare maximization. The determination of the 
optimal point requires a social welfare function. Given such a func­
tion, the problem is solved and running back through the analysis 
determines the allocation of and Xg in production and and in 
consumption. 
Problems with the Social Optima 
Several problems exist in applying the above methodology. The 
social welfare function determines whose values or ethics count and 
is not scientifically derivable. The maximization of social welfare 
(W) where W = W (U, , U„ ... U ) requires that 
J. z m 
d" = tsT + iu: <"2 + - + icT ° ' «> 
12 m 
Determination of the most efficient policy requires knowledge of the 
9 W individual weights and these are unknown because of the infeasi-
bility of interpersonal comparisons. 
If it is assumed that each individual counts and that pareto 
optimality in production and consumption is a desirable state of 
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affairs, then the grand utility possibility frontier is the measuring 
stick. In this case, only knowledge regarding the direction of change 
(dU) is forthcoming. This is not particularly helpful since, as shown 
above, an infinite number of efficient points exist and nothing can be 
said about changes which make one individual better off and another 
worse off. Policy evaluation is foreclosed since this describes the 
usual situation. 
The failure of the above approach led to development of compensa­
tion tests (Henderson and Quandt, 68). The Kaldor criterion judges 
a policy or state of affairs to be more efficient than another if a 
move to it allows gainers to more than adequately compensate losers. 
The Hicks criterion holds that efficiency is increased if, after a 
change, losers cannot compensate gainers. The Scitovsky criterion 
requires both of the above conditions to be met when prices change. 
The difficulty of compensation tests is that only potential rather than 
actual welfare is considered since such payments need not be made. 
Additionally, transactions costs associated with compensation may 
actually lead to a reduction in welfare. 
The economic approach to determination of the proper role of 
government suggests that governments should promote pareto efficiency 
thereby maximizing social welfare (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 6). However, 
in application, pareto optimality is too normative for some, fails to 
consider other objectives, and does not adequately model the reality of 
the political process (Bromley, 17; Schmid, 112; Steiner, 119; 
Wildavsky, 139). 
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It is argued that marginal rates of substitution and transformation 
are determined by prices and these as well as the ability to compensate 
depends on the initial distribution of property rights (Mishan, 92; 
Randall, 104; Schmid, 112). Because of this, efficiency and distribu­
tional questions cannot be separated (Bromley, 17; VanKooten, 136). 
The end result is that for the economy as a whole, no fully adequate ef­
ficiency criterion for comparison of alternative policies or states of 
nature exists in the absence of value judgments (Ladd, 75). 
Efficiency in Policy Analysis 
In conducting policy analysis, economists have shied away from the 
use of social optima due to the problems mentioned above (Castle et al., 
24; Andrews, 2). Despite economists' inability to specify a socially 
optimal policy, welfare economics provides a framework for analyzing the 
impacts of policies and policy changes. With respect to soil conserva­
tion policy, economic analysis could focus on the level of investment 
in conservation. The effects of a change in the amount being spent 
could be examined to see who gains and who loses. However, this is not 
the level of analysis undertaken here. Government-sponsored soil con­
servation efforts will undoubtedly be continued. It is also unlikely 
that the level of government involvement in soil management will change 
by any order of magnitude. Political decisions are made incrementally 
so funding levels will likely remain near present levels (Crosson, 38). 
An alternative application of welfare economics would be to focus 
on the effects of changes in policy or programs given the level of 
investment. In the absence of distributional considerations, efficiency 
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would require achievement of the largest possible returns from the 
investment. If this occurs, then production efficiency results whether 
or not overall pareto optimality exists. This is the concept of 
efficiency that will be used in the remainder of the study. It is the 
basis of the analysis of soil conservation policy. 
Economists have advocated production efficiency while realizing 
that it is not all that matters (Schultze, 114; Haveman, 62). Efficiency 
criteria are used for a number of reasons. First, basing decisions on 
a systematic, reasoned approach is likely to produce consequences 
superior to those that would arise from following purely stochastic 
behavior (Krutilla, 74). Production efficiency assures that a minimum 
of resources is expended in reaching a goal. Second, the results of 
such analyses can be viewed as informative rather than prescriptive in 
nature (Randall, 105). The efficiency view is thus presented as one of 
several viewpoints to be considered. Third, political decisions may be 
efficient politically but need not be from any other point of view 
(Haveman, 60; Robbins, 109). Economic efficiency is at least as 
legitimate as other advocacy roles and should be considered. Explicitly 
defined value judgments can then be combined with objective analyses to 
form a "political economy". Fourth, economics can trace the relationship 
between policies and the results of policies (Stigler, 120). Past 
mistakes can be examined and future ones may be avoided. Fifth, it is 
often possible to show what is wrong even if what is right or best is 
not determined (Baumol, 11). While distributional and other issues 
are not clear cut, the efficiency aspects of alternative programs provide 
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a basis for comparison which may lead to rejection of the worst ones. 
Government, Market Failure, and the Soil Resource 
The equality of the marginal rates of substitution and the marginal 
rates of transformation necessary for pareto optimality is guaranteed in 
purely competitive markets since prices are the same for all producers 
and consumers (Henderson and Quandt, 68). In such cases, private 
markets maximize social welfare and governments need not interfere 
(Davis and Kamien, 45). The absence of markets or the occurrence of 
joint production, externalities, public goods, monopoly or other devia­
tions render pareto efficient production and/or consumption uncertain. 
Market failure distorts prices so that economic efficiency is no longer 
guaranteed. 
When market failure leads to pareto or production inefficiency, 
there is usually pressure to overcome it through collective action. 
However, market failure is usually a matter of degree and the transac­
tions costs impeding markets can be reduced through a variety of social 
institutions of which government is only one (Arrow, 4). Social norms 
of behavior can be established in ways other than governmental forms 
(Young, 143) so that evidence of market failure is not a sufficient 
condition for government intervention. Indeed, it has been shown that 
governmental efforts to remedy perceived market failures have been the 
most important sources of inefficiency in resource allocation (Stiglitz, 
121). 
Three broad levels of market failure are alleged to exist with 
respect to soil use: (1) markets undervalue the soil resource; 
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(2) markets function but individual decision makers fail to act optimal­
ly; (3) externalities are present. Each of these is considered in more 
detail. 
Undervaluation 
Conservationists sometimes argue that markets do not adequately 
reflect the value of soil with the result that too little conservation 
occurs (Sampson, 111). Economic theory suggests that the capitalized 
value of a farmer's land is equal to the sum of the discounted net re­
turns to the land into the indefinite future (Melichar, 89). To the 
extent that this occurs, even those who plan to hold land only for a 
short period of time must be sensitive to the long run effects of their 
actions. If the farmer is unable to capture all of the returns to 
land (externalities exist) or if he discounts at a higher rate than 
society, then land will be undervalued by that individual from a 
social viewpoint. It could then be argued that land markets are myopic 
and fail to adequately perceive the future. 
The myopia argument might proceed along several different lines. 
First, the market determined value of the soil may be inaccurate because 
of incorrect assessments of future food and fiber demands, rates of 
technological change, and/or land supplies by market participants 
(Cresson and Brubaker, 41). If the market underestimates demand or 
overestimates supply the soil will be undervalued. Second, a lack of 
knowledge regarding the linkage between erosion and productivity over 
time may also yield undervaluation. Farmers may fail to consider the 
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diminution in future production caused by present erosion. Third, it 
is possible that the market gives less weight to productivity maintenance 
as a hedge against uncertainty than does society (Crosson and Miranowski, 
42). Society must plan as if it is immortal and must protect the 
interests of future generations (Brubaker, 18). This difference in 
responsibility to the future between the market and society may result 
in a market-determined soil value which is less than society's valua­
tion. 
It obviously is important to know whether or to what extent under­
valuation occurs. While the evidence has yet to be carefully studied, 
it would seem unlikely that policy makers or others outside the land 
market have superior information to that of market participants. This 
would cast considerable doubt on the first and second reasons above as 
a basis for governmental intervention. The third reason is the basis for 
Ciriacy-Wantrup's safe minimum standard of conservation (25). Other 
economists have also seen it as the most important argument supporting 
undervaluation (Crosson and Brubaker, 41; Crosson and Miranowski, 42). 
Decision maker failure 
It may be the case that markets accurately reflect societal values 
but participants are unable to provide the optimal level of conserva­
tion. Irrationality, competitive pressures, capital constraints, and 
institutional arrangements may lead to a kind of market failure (Crosson 
and Brubaker, 41). 
Land is the farmer's most important asset and substantial incentives 
exist to acquire and act on information that will maintain or protect 
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his investment in this asset. It seems highly unlikely that farmers 
will act irrationally in making land use decisions. 
A farmer may find that competitive pressures or capital constraints 
keep him from making optimal investments in the soil resource. While 
a financial squeeze may force a farmer to ignore long run effects of 
present actions, if the market is functioning, such a situation can only 
be temporary. He will likely compare the effects of erosive practices 
with those arising from conservation practices and choose the course of 
action which yields the highest capitalized value. Government assistance 
can shorten the duration of such temporary situations. 
Institutional arrangements may also yield temporary deviations 
from the optimal investment strategies. It is suggested that soil in­
vestment decisions will be different for corporate farms than owner 
operators, and that these will differ from those made by tenants (Lee, 
78). McConnell (85) has shown that if markets function, corporations 
and owner operators that face the same prices and use the same inputs 
will make identical conservation decisions. It is true that tenants 
will make different land use decisions since they do not bear long run 
erosion costs. However, owners who rent may require tenants to adopt 
conservation practices or may invest in such practices themselves. 
Owners with substantial interests outside agriculture may respond some­
what slower than owner operators but if markets are functioning, they 
may be expected to take action. In fact, Lee and Stewart found higher 
conservation tillage adoption rates among part owner and tenant 
farmers than among full owner operators. 
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Fiscal policy may also introduce distortions preventing optimal use 
of conservation practices. Tax policy may lead to increased erosion if 
it encourages short term investment in agriculture by outside investors. 
If the primary motive for holding land is for its preferred tax status, 
the incentive to maintain soil productivity may be absent. 
Additionally, certain landowners may deduct the cost of some soil 
conservation practices as an operating expense. Landowners must 
"materially participate" and deductions are limited to 25% of gross 
farm income in any one year. The effects of the deduction depend 
on the size of the expenditure, the amount of farm and nonfarm 
income, and the size of the deduction. While the deduction has been 
linked to an increased likelihood of practice adoption, other variables 
were much more important and tax policy was found to play only a minor 
role in the adoption decision (Davenport et al., 44). Nevertheless, 
Boron suggests that removal of the restriction on nonoperator landlords 
would increase conservation practice usage. 
Externalities 
Market failure may also result from externalities in the form of 
offsite pollution damages. Farmers cannot be expected to provide the 
optimal level of conservation if many of the benefits accrue to society 
at large. The major impact of soil erosion has been found to be offsite 
in nature (McConnell, 85; Dechant, 46). Although important, this argu­
ment has received little attention in present policy formation (Crosson 
and Miranowski, 42). 
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In summary, the three main justifications for government investment 
in soil conservation on market failure grounds would seem to be 
(1) maintenance of soil productivity as insurance against an uncertain 
future; (2) overcoming obstacles that prevent farmers from making 
optimal investments on their own; and (3) internalization of 
externalities borne at present by society. 
As mentioned above, evidence of market failure and/or inefficient 
private behavior, while necessary, is not sufficient to justify govern­
mental attention (Rausser, 108). Farm leaders, conservationists, and 
politicians are seemingly aware of the weakness of the arguments for 
government investment in conservation (Dechant, 46; Giltmeier, 57). 
Therefore, in the absence of such 'sufficient' evidence, government 
investment has been justified on ethical grounds. A conservation ethic 
is promoted. The ethic, based on principles of stewardship, advocates 
leaving the land unchanged. Since farmers are not adhering to such an 
ethic on their own, government efforts are seen as being necessary to 
assist some and force others to believe and act accordingly (Sampson, 
111). 
Despite economic and ethical arguments for government investment 
in the soil resource, conservation measures to date appear to be under­
taken as a means to achieve other goals (Strohbehn, 122). These other 
goals have Included support of farm prices, raising farm income, increas­
ing agricultural productivity and reducing input costs. This view may 
change as further research broadens our understanding of resource 
adequacy, the nature of technological change, erosion-productivity 
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linkages, institutional constraints, and the extent of offsite damages 
(externalities). 
Program Review and Evaluation 
Soil conservation has been on the national agenda at least since 
1929 when $160,000 was allocated to establish erosion measurement sta­
tions and fund related research. Subsequent legislation authorized 
data collection activities as well as the development of soil conserva­
tion districts to oversee conservation funding. There are now 34 pro­
grams administered by the USDA which deal with soil and water conserva­
tion (USDA, 127). Although multiple objectives exist, only the soil 
conservation aspects of the various programs are presented below. 
Present programs provide technical assistance to aid farmers in develop­
ing a conservation plan. Payments to farmers who use approved conserva­
tion practices or reduce the tillage of erosive soils are provided on a 
cost share basis. Long term agreements to reduce erosion are encouraged 
and best management practices are promoted through financial and tech­
nical assistance. Loans and tax deductions are provided as incentives, 
research is funded and education is promoted all with the goal of in­
creasing soil conservation. Spending for soil conservation amounted to 
about $1 billion in 1982 (Leman and Miranowski, 81). 
Despite these numerous programs, soil erosion problems remain—23% 
of the farmland in the U.S. erodes at what is termed an unacceptable 
rate (USDA, 126). A major shortcoming of the policy-making process has 
been the failure to perform program evaluations and thereby develop an 
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analytical basis on which policy decisions could be justified (Leman, 
80). The data for such appraisals were not even collected prior to 
the 1970s. However, as pressures for efficiency in government increased, 
congressional attention was focused on soil conservation programs by a 
number of studies. The General Accounting Office found inefficient 
practices in a number of programs and suggested that evaluations and 
a number of changes be made (Comptroller General of the U.S., 28-33). 
The environmental movement also added impetus to such a drive. The 
National Resource Inventory (NRI) and the Soil and Water Resources 
Conservation Act of 1977 (RCA) were the results. The NRI collected 
data necessary for evaluation efforts, while the RCA required the USDA 
to appraise the condition of soil and water resources, evaluate exist­
ing programs, and develop a national soil and water conservation program. 
The appraisal based on NRI and other data has been completed (USDA, 126, 
127) and a program has-been proposed (USDA, 128). However, the program 
evaluation phase has largely been ignored (Leman, 80; Congress of the 
U.S., 34). 
Some program evaluations have arisen as outgrowths of the earlier 
General Accounting Office studies or as the result of presidential 
requests. The Soil Conservation Service (SCS) evaluated the Great 
Plains Conservation Program in 1974 and concluded that more soil could 
be conserved with no increase in cost by redistributing funds among 
states. An even greater amount of erosion control could be achieved if 
conservation practices on farms were modified (USDA, 132). The Resource 
Conservation and Development Act was reviewed (USDA, 134) and as part of 
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an ongoing study, the Agricultural Conservation Program (ACP) was evalu­
ated for the 1975-1978 period (USDA, 129). The ACP study found that 
the amount of soil conservation obtained under the program could be 
tripled without increasing costs by directing practices to the most 
erosive soils. Further increases in conservation would occur if the 
most efficient conservation practices were utilized by individual 
farmers. 
These evaluation results have given rise to the concept of improv­
ing governmental efficiency by targeting an increased proportion of 
USDA conservation program funds to specific areas of the country and to 
specific practices (USDA, 128). Targeting of assistance as a means of 
increasing efficiency of conservation efforts has been called the 'wave 
of the future' (Meyers, 90). 
Targeting proposals 
Criteria for effective targeting have been suggested in a number of 
studies and program proposals. As administered by the SCS, the portion 
of Conservation Technical Assistance (CTA) funds targeted is to be 
allocated to special geographic areas with the most "persistent and 
critical" erosion problems. Specific considerations for an area to be 
so designated include (1) the severity (tons/acre) and the extent 
(number of acres involved) of the erosion problem; (2) expected results; 
(3) willingness of farmers in the area to participate; and (4) the ef­
fect of erosion on agricultural productivity and its linkage to offsite 
damages (USDA, 131). The first three are briefly discussed in the 
program outline, although no specific performance measures are 
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presented. How severe does the erosion problem have to be? What per­
centage of farmers must be willing to participate? The effect of ero­
sion on productivity is not mentioned further. Since so little is known 
about the subject, such an approach is understandable; yet productivity 
maintenance is one of the main justifications given for erosion control 
in the RCA program document (USDA, 128). The CTA program further pro­
vides for local, state and federal cooperation in the targeting of 
additional funds based on the size and extent of the problem, the type 
of agriculture involved, the number of farms involved and "significant 
social and economic" conditions. There is thus ample room for interpre­
tation. Indeed, the criteria are such that the broad geographic areas 
delineated to date include over 33 million acres for 1981-1982 program 
benefits, about that many more for 1983, and 80 million acres more in 
subsequent years. This targeting proposal would eventually allocate 
CTA funds to over 35% of U.S. cropland. However, the funds involved 
are miniscule—less than 1% of the SCS budget and less than 2% of 
conservation technical assistance funds in 1981. The amount is slated 
to increase by up to 5% of the CTA budget per year until 25% of CTA 
funds are targeted. 
Other suggestions with respect to targeting have called for funds 
to be targeted to "critically erosive lands", "special areas", and 
"areas with acute treatment needs" (Ogg et al., 99). These are all 
later defined to be areas whose soils account for most of the erosion 
and sedimentation in the country. Taken literally, this would seem to 
focus conservation efforts on the 8.7% of cropland which accounts for 
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52% of all erosion or about 36 million acres. 
A third proposal focuses efforts where there is an identified 
physical problem as measured by soil depth and erosion rates (Ogg and 
Miller, 97). A fourth proposal targets matching grant funds to geo­
graphic land areas having critical soil erosion or upstream flooding 
problems of national significance as determined by the SCS (USDA, 130). 
The ACP evaluation suggested targeting according to the potential 
for erosion reduction and on the most efficient practices (USDA, 129). 
This approach is said to direct assistance according to the extent and 
efficiency with which soil erosion problems will be solved. The RCA 
Program Report suggested targeting to critical areas on the basis of 
the threat to productivity of the soil. The broadest proposal simply 
suggests focusing on erosion prone soils (Sampson, 111). 
All currently proposed sets of targeting criteria include in some 
form the idea that severity of erosion is important where severity is 
measured in tons/acre. The assumption is that the greater the loss, 
the greater is the problem; i.e., the more serious the productivity loss 
and the greater the offsite damages. Although further considerations 
include soil depth, sedimentation, productivity, results expected, will­
ingness of farmers to participate, and the most efficient (least cost) 
practices, these are largely secondary or noted as limitations of the 
various studies. Thus, evaluations to date have used primarily a physi­
cal efficiency criterion (gross soil loss) whose accuracy and relevance 
are questionable (Cook, 37; Congress of the U.S., 34; Sampson, 111). 
This approach assumes all soils are equally productive and yield equal 
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amounts of offsite damages while denying that some resources are more 
valuable than others or that some soils may not be worth conserving. 
Inadequate information has hindered the assessment of productivity 
impacts and the valuation of different soil types. The effects of 
specific practices on productivity and soil loss are unknown as are 
the offsite damages linkage to erosion and the erosion control produc­
tion function. If soils vary in value (productivity) or if the amount 
of offsite damages are not directly related to the amount of erosion, 
then present evaluation efforts that provide measures of conservation 
in terms of tons of soil can be misleading. Targeting recommendations 
based on such evaluations are wasteful to the extent that low valued 
soils (or those yielding small offsite damages) are conserved while 
high valued soils (or those associated with large offsite damages) 
erode away. It seems that economic criteria must be combined with the 
physical criteria to increase the efficiency of soil conservation 
efforts. Such economic criteria for improving soil conservation 
efforts are developed in Chapter IV from a profit maximizing model. 
Then, in Chapter V, the implications of the criteria are examined by 
estimating implicit prices of soil conservation. 
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CHAPTER IV. THE ECONOMIC FRAMEWORK OF CONSERVATION 
Although Heady (66, 67), Bunce (20), Hotelling (70), Ciriacy-Wantrup 
(25) and others presented the economics of soil use prior to the early 
1950s, little more was done on the subject until the mid-1970s. Burt 
(21) suggests that this inactivity resulted as technology diminished the 
role of soil resources in production. During the 1970s, studies began 
examining erosion as it affected water quality. The Center for Agri­
cultural and Rural Development at Iowa State University performed a 
number of such analyses using a national linear programming model 
(Holding, 69). There and elsewhere, research focused on the optimal 
form of government policy and the optimal on farm conservation practices 
(Ogg et al., 98). Recent research has focused on the dynamics of soil 
use (Burt, 21; Shortle, 117; McConnell, 85). Little, however, has been 
done from a policy evaluation perspective. 
Analytical Problems 
Economic analysis of soil resource use is difficult and complex. 
The allocation of soil among uses and over time is a problem in capital 
theory made even more difficult by the multi-dimensional nature of the 
resource. While the quantity of soil used is obviously important, so 
is its quality. However, quality can be measured in a number of ways-
soil depth, percent organic matter, tilth, rooting zone, slope, etc. 
These factors vary by site so that it is difficult to consider soil as . 
a homogeneous resource and proceed in the usual fashion. Furthermore, 
soil is only one of many inputs in the production of agricultural 
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commodities. Water, sunlight, air, climate, labor, and capital 
(machinery, knowledge, nutrients) are also necessary. There are trade­
offs between soil and other inputs and between other inputs and soil 
characteristics. Such tradeoffs not only occur within a specific 
planning period but extend over time. 
Technical change poses additional problems. Changes in technology 
are important determinants of substitution; yet the future direction 
and rate of such changes are unknown. Capturing the dynamic aspect of 
soil use is compounded by inadequate information on such changes as 
well as on the rates of formation and/or depletion of soil and soil 
characteristics. 
Externalities also complicate the analysis. Joint outputs from 
the production process include sediment, nutrients, and other chemicals 
encompassed in soil erosion, as well as desired agricultural commodities. 
Costs arising from such incidental outputs are usually incurred by 
others in the form of offsite externalities. Furthermore, some inputs 
such as soil characteristics are not individually priced. The lack of 
a complete set of input and output prices limits economic analysis. 
The multiple objectives associated with soil use also give rise to 
modeling difficulties. The farmer wishes to earn a comfortable living 
and is often assumed to maximize profits. He may also have objectives 
of good stewardship, minimizing risk or staying in business all of which 
may cause actions to diverge from those derived from profit maximization. 
Society has long had low cost food and fiber as an objective. More 
recently, the desire for clean air, clean water, and open spaces as well 
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as the social goals of family farms and a guarantee of adequate cropland 
for future generations have become important considerations in soil use 
decisions. Economic analysis usually assumes maximization of an objec­
tive function and when multiple objectives exist, weights for each 
objective must be applied if the analyst is to provide quantifiable 
results. 
A Static Economic Model 
A simple production model that ignores many of the above issues 
yet provides useful insight into soil use and conservation decisions 
is presented below. Simplifying assumptions are later dropped to examine 
the effects of time on the optimal resource allocation criteria. Al­
though the simple model is well-known in economics, it is reviewed as a 
basis for developing a more realistic model and to highlight its impli­
cations for soil conservation which might otherwise be overlooked. 
Consider an implicit agricultural production function of the form 
F(Y^ ... Y^, ... X^ ) = 0 . (9) 
Let the Y^s be outputs and the X^ s be inputs. Outputs include com, 
soybeans, other agricultural commodities and soil erosion. Inputs in­
clude labor, capital (tillage equipment, conservation practices, etc.), 
water, and soil (organic matter content, soil depth, etc.). The func­
tion is assumed to possess continuous first and second order partial 
derivatives and thus allows for joint products (Mittelhammer et al., 94). 
Let profits be given as 
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n m 
^ = 1 P.Y. - 1 R.X (10) 
i=l j=l ^ ^ 
where and are prices of the ith output and jth input. The pro­
ducer maximizes profits subject to a production function constraint 
so that his objectives may be expressed as the maximization of L where 
n m 
(11) L = y p.Y. - y R.X. + F(Y. ... Y , Xt ... X ) . 
>1 1 1 J J 1 n 1 m 
The partial derivatives (first order conditions) are: 
Iy  ^= ^ i + 1^  =0 i = 1 ... n (12) 
i i 
ix^  = -Kj + = 0 j = 1 ... m (13) 
J J 
# = F(Y. ... Y , X ... X. ) . (14) 
oA 1 n 1 m 
These conditions summarize the accepted rules for optimal produc­
tion. Condition 12 can be interpreted as follows: P^ is the marginal 
9 F 
value of output and A is the change in the value of total produc-
i 
tion that results from the last unit of Y^  produced. To produce Y^, 
3 F 
production of other outputs had to be adjusted. The term can thus 
be viewed as a marginal opportunity cost of producing Y^. Condition 12 
requires that marginal benefits equal marginal costs. 
8 F 
In Condition 13, R- is the marginal resource cost and A-^  is the 
j 
marginal value of the last unit of resource used. Again, marginal 
costs are equated to marginal benefits. Condition 14 insures the tech­
nological conditions of production are not violated. 
Using 12, letting i = 1, k and moving the second term to the right 
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yields (by the implicit function rule) 
P 1 8F/3Y^ BY (15) 
P. k 3F/9Y^ 9Y^ 
The marginal rate of transformation between products equals the price 
ratio. Let the two products under consideration be soil erosion from 
two types of soil. The relative value of the soils should equal the 
rate at which the soils can be substituted for each other. Soils 
might be viewed as substitutes to the extent that productivity rates 
and erosivity vary. If soil 1 is twice as productive as soil k, then 
from a productivity point of view, one ton of soil erosion from soil 1 
can be substituted for two tons of soil erosion from k. According to 
equation 15, soil 1 should therefore be twice as valuable as soil k, 
other things being equal. One ton of soil of type 1 saved need not 
equal a ton of type k, although this is the assumption that underlies 
most evaluations and targeting proposals to date. 
Consider equation 13 where j=l,m. With appropriate manipulation 
and by invoking the implicit function rule. 
The marginal rate of substitution between inputs is equal to the price 
ratio. Optimal allocation would find conservation practice one substi­
tuting for practice two at the rate ^2/^2' 
For any output i and input j from equations 12 and 13, 
R SF/3X ax 
9F/3X (16) 
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The value of the marginal product (MVP) of any input should be equal to 
its price. In other words, the ratio of the value of the marginal 
product to input price should equal one for efficient resource utiliza­
tion. Government investment in conservation occurs because of perceived 
nonoptimal resource allocation. That is, MVP../R.7^1 where MVP., is the 
J I] 
marginal value product of input j in the production of output i. Given 
limited resources, it may not be possible to extend resource use to the 
point that a dollar's worth of input yields a dollar's worth of output. 
In such a case, the best that can be done is to use resources in produc­
ing products with the greatest return on investment. This occurs when 
the following conditions hold: 
«^12 ««'21 , 1 = 1... n ,,,, 
1- j . 1 ... m 
These conditions provide the economic rationale for targeting. Funds 
should be targeted to those inputs (soils and practices, for example) 
with the largest marginal value product to price ratio. This will result 
in the greatest return on investment and efficient resource allocation. 
Other things being equal, conservation efforts should be focused on those 
areas where the economic damage due to erosion is the greatest. This 
need not be where soil erosion is occurring most rapidly. 
Externalities and other forms of market failure can be incorporated 
into the above framework through the cost or benefit side. Consider 
Figure 2 where the farmer's optimal level of erosion is represented by 
Op. The MCp curve traces out the marginal costs of reducing erosion 
while the curve represents the marginal benefits of reducing erosion. 
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Level of soil erosion 
Figure 2. A farmer's view of the optimal level of soil erosion 
MB 
$ 
MB. 
MC. 
Level of soil erosion 0, 0 
Figure 3. The optimal level of soil erosion as perceived by society 
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While the present analysis is static, in an intertemporal sense, the 
curves could be viewed as marginals of the sum of the discounted cost 
and benefit streams. Note that low levels of erosion are associated 
with small benefits and large costs of erosion control while the opposite 
is true at high levels of erosion (USDA, 129). Figure 2 depicts margin­
al costs and benefits from the farmer's point of view. 
In Figure 3, society's values are shown along with the farmer's. 
Society incurs additional cost from erosion so that at any level of 
erosion, the marginal benefits from reducing erosion are greater than 
those perceived by the farmer (MBg)• Societal marginal benefits might 
include all those perceived by the farmer plus the value of reduced off-
site effects and any additional benefits due to market failure. The 
resulting social optimum, Og, yields less erosion than the farmer 
finds optimal. 
In order to reduce erosion to Og, U.S. policy makers have chosen 
to subsidize conservation practices which effectively shifts the curve 
MCp in Figure 3 to the left. An optimal subsidy (s) would result in 
MC„„. In teirms of the model presented above, the marginal cost to the 
r o 
farmer is no longer but (l-s)Rj. Optimal resource allocation 
requires 
S 3?i 
R. = Pi ^ (19) 
% 9Y. 
(1 s)Rj (20) 
S F 
where P^, are the values of (soil erosion or soil conservation) 
57 
from society's and the farmer's respective points of view. From equa­
tions 19 and 20, 
The difference in soil values between a farmer and society may reflect 
not only offsite effects but the value of differences between market 
and social responsibility to the future. To the extent that other 
sources of failure (mentioned previously) exist, they are also accounted 
market failure. 
A major problem of the above formulation is the failure to include 
time. Decisions in the present period will affect future options and 
this is especially true for the soil resource. A decision to erode a 
soil in one period obviously affects the amount and quality of soil 
available in future periods. A modification to allow consideration of 
such effects is developed in the next section. 
An Intertemporal Economic Model 
Consider a farmer who desires to optimize a production plan over 
T periods. The implicit production function is 
where (i = 1 ... N, t = 1 ... T) is the amount of product i produced 
in period t; (j = 1 ... M, t = 1 ... T) is the amount of input j used 
(22) 
(21) 
S F for in this term. Thus, is a measure of the extent or cost of 
f(^ll "• \t' ^11 0 (23) 
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in period t; and (t = 1 ... T) is the soil stock in period t. The 
soil stock changes over time according to 
K t+1 ^t ®t^ l^l ••• ^ Nt' ^ 11 ••• \t' *1 Kf) ' (24) 
That is, this period's soil stock is equal to last period's plus net 
soil formation 
gt(Yii ... Yjjj., ... ... K^ ) . (25) 
Net soil formation includes both soil generation and soil erosion and 
is affected by previous outputs, inputs and levels of soil stock. The 
measurement problems associated with the dynamics of soil formation and 
soil erosion were discussed previously. Making this equation operational 
might be done in several ways. Burt (21) used the percentage of 
organic matter as a measure of the stock while Shortle (117) used soil 
depth. For present purposes, the conceptual approach is sufficient. 
The maximization of profits in any period is defined as 
N M 
(26) 
However, the objective over time is to maximize the discounted value 
of the profit stream. Let the discount factor be 
= l/(l+r)' . (27) 
Then, where t = 1 ... T, 
T T _ N M 
^ = I = I - I %itXit) • 
t=l  ^ t=l i=l j=l 
(28) 
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There will also be a 'terminal value' at the end of the planning period. 
Assume that all fixed inputs except land are fully depreciated and have 
no value at the end of period T. The value of land is assumed to be the 
sum of the discounted net returns into the indefinite future and will 
depend on soil stock in period T+1. Let this value be denoted as 
v<Vi)-
The optimization problem is formulated as 
T . N  M  
JT+1, 
J 
subject to a production function constraint, 
Max[ I 3^ ( I P Y - I RifX.r) + 6 + V(IL )] (29) 
t=l i=l ^ 1=1 i+x 
f(Y^ j^  •** ... ••• K^ ) 0 (30) 
the soil stock equation of motion. 
-  h - V " u  • • •  V -  " i  • • •  \ )  =  "  0 1 )  
and nonnegativity constraints on inputs, outputs, and soil stocks. 
X_, Y^^, > 0 for all i,j,t . (32) 
The corresponding lagrangian expression (33) includes both dis­
counted (A) and undis counted multipliers (6 ). The latter are dis-
t+1 
counted by the factors 3 
• n,I + B'-'IVCKj+I) + X£<Y Ï 
t=l 1=1 J=1 •' 
T 
Xii.. ' - ' ' Kr) - \ -
t=l 
••• V' "l ••• V • (33) 
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The Kuhn-Tucker conditions listed below characterize the solution 
to the problem if one exists. In any period l<t<T and for j = 1 ... M, 
i = 1 ... N, these are: 
Pif + ^  #- + = 0; Y, > 0 (34) 
Mt It C+1 3?lt 
 ^ + ^ +16'"'' 3#^  = 0;  ^0 (35) 
aXjt jt ax 
9K^   ^9Kj. ^t+1^ aK^) G 0; > 0 (36) 
T+1 - 0 Kt+1 - 0 '(37) 
f(Yii ... ... X^, ... K^) = 0 (38) 
- K - ëjy,, ... Y„_ X„ ... X„ . K, ... KJ = 0 . 36 +^1 t+1 \ Bt^ 'll ••• Nt' ""11 ••• "Mt' '^ l t 
(39) 
In order to derive values for the multipliers 6j., t = 1 ... T, 
must be positive in all periods. It seems safe to assume that soil 
stocks will remain at positive levels. Also, in equations 34 and 35, 
if Y^j. and X^^ are to be nonnegative, these conditions require equality 
to zero and this will be used in what follows. 
Condition 36 is a recursive relation in 6^. From 36, 
-t 3f 3g+. 
*t = AG *t+l9(l + 
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Completing the iteration and using equation 37 yields 
||- + [(Xg-k 11^ ) V 3(1 + ^ )] + ||- Î 3(1 + % . (41) 
 ^ ^^t &=t 4^ &=t 
The interpretation of equation 41 is more easily made after addi­
tional manipulation. From equation 24, 
• <«' 
Successive application of the chain rule for implicit functions gives 
3K. k-1 ag 
Trr TT (1 + -r^ ) (43) 
i=t 
and substituting 43 into 41 yields 
't - J/"" ^ ^ 
The second term on the right is the value in period t of changes 
in the terminal value function resulting from the use of soil stock in 
t. The first term is the value in t of changes in the value of produc­
tion over all periods of time resulting from soil stock changes in t. 
Thus, 6^ is the marginal effect of soil stock use in t on production in 
all periods and on the terminal value. It is the present value of the 
sacrifices being imposed on the future and may be termed the user cost 
of soil. It is possible for the user cost to be negative if diminished 
stocks increase the value of production more than they decrease the 
terminal value. 
Conditions 34 and 35 qre similar in interpretation to equations 12 
and 13 of the simple model. Moving price to one side and dividing by 3^ 
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in 34 yields 
i^t 9Y. ~ ^t+l^ 3Y^  * (45) 
it it 
The first term on the right is the marginal opportunity cost in produc­
tion while the second term is the marginal cost associated with stock 
changes arising from production of Here, marginal benefits are 
equated to marginal costs and the latter includes future as well as 
present costs. 
Similar manipulation of 35 yields 
"jt - • <«' 
The price of an input is equated to its value in current production plus 
its marginal value in all future periods as reflected by the change in 
stocks it delivers times the user cost. Again, the result is similar 
to the static model only now, the effect on the future must also be 
considered. 
Form the ratio of 26 and 27. After rearranging terms, 
- 't+1 # ^ gT-t # = _gT-t _5r 
P _ 6  ^  it T+1 3Y. SY. ^ 
IT IT 
for all t, T= 1 ... T, i=l ... N, j =1 ... M. Further manipulation 
of 37 yields 
*jt = ia:; + *t+iG â#:; + 
J 
R.. - « ^^3 - 6__,, (48) jt t+1^ 8X. T+1 3Y. 9X iT9X. 
J  L IT  J  L J  •jt 
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and, where t = T 
3Y 
*jt = Pit ax;; i : 1 ::: % - w*) 
Equation 49 is comparable to 17 of the static model and has an 
analogous interpretation. An input should be used up to the point 
where marginal cost just equals marginal benefit. Since both inputs 
and outputs are in the same period, it is a comparative static condi­
tion. Where input and output effects are in different periods of time, 
equation 48 requires the marginal value product be adjusted to a common 
time period (discounted to t) and the change in user costs between time 
periods must be added. 
Since soil stocks are included in the intertemporal production 
function, the impact on production from a change in stocks arising 
from changes in input j and output i is considered. Relationships 
similar to 15 and 16 can be derived in the same way as 48 and 49 and 
allow calculation of the marginal rates of transformation and marginal 
rates of substitution. 
Equation 48 also imposes a flow condition in terms of the optimum 
rate of use of the stock. The rate of natural resource use at any point 
in time should be such that the marginal value of output is equal to 
the marginal opportunity cost of resources used plus a marginal user 
cost. 
Condition 36 imposes an additional stock condition. Moving 3($^ to 
the right and multiplying by g in 36 gives 
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X6 If- + 6 +^1 + .^ t+1 H: = (50) 
rearranging terms 
W; - - 1 
r<5t = + (.6^+1 - 0^ + 6^+1 ^ • (51) 
That is, the stock of the resource at any point in time should be such 
that the opportunity cost of holding the stock (%6^ ) just equals the 
marginal value of the stock in production plus the appreciation of the 
stock plus the value of the stock in producing soil. From equation 51, 
it is possible to derive the behavior of the user cost over time; 
^t+1 ~ ^ t = ""^ t " ^ t+1 8K^  - ||- . (52) 
Letting time periods become very short, 
if = ^^ t - ^ t+lif^  - Ad+r)"""^^ H" (53) 
and the rate of change is thus 
d6t 
The rate of change in user cost equals the rate of interest less a 
factor which reflects the effect of the stock on soil formation (-fê—) 
af ' 
and on production (-^). Let the rate of formation be invariant to the 
dK 
stock ("l^- =0). If > 0, then user cost grows at a rate less than 
r. In this case, a change in the soil stock has a positive effect on 
productivity so that either a dividend accrues to holding soil in place 
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(dK^  > 0) or a premium is attached to soil stock depletion (dK^ < 0). 
9f 
When < 0, user cost grows more rapidly than r so that a penalty 
t 
is attached to soil stock changes. 
3 f ^ ^ 11 g g 
Assume = 0 and —^ —> 0. Then, if > 0, the rate of growth 
in user cost is less than the rate of interest. A dividend on invest­
ments in soil maintenance (dK^ > 0) or erosive activities (dK^ < 0) 
results since future costs are reduced from what they would have been 
9 g 
otherwise. When < 0, the user cost grows at a rate greater than r. 
t 
The difference is due to the increased costs imposed on the future as 
changes in the soil stock decrease soil formation. 
When both productivity and soil formation are unaffected by stock 
changes, then user cost grows at the rate of interest. This is the 
classical result derived by Hotelling (70). 
Interest usually focuses on price rather than user cost. In the 
formulation of the model, erosion was assumed to be an output even though 
it could be viewed as an input. The reason for this can now be clari­
fied. If farmers optimally allocate resources so that condition 47 is 
satisfied, the marginal product —— takes into account present deci-
J' SYit 
sion's effects on the future. Assuming accurate measures of —— and 
R are available, the implicit value of Y (that is P.) can be found. 
J ^ 
Where ^ is the price of a conservation practice and is erosion in 
t, then is the value of a ton of soil erosion. 
The rate of change in soil value under optimal management can be 
calculated. Using the discrete time approach used thus far, condition 
45 implies that optimal prices in t and t+1 will be 
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" " 9Y^  "  ^ (55) 
Subtracting 55 from 56 gives 
= -«3^ - 3%) - ^ 
(57) 
Let T^—^ = -1 where Y is the rate of erosion (no soil forma-
^^ it+1 9Tit _.+!) 
tion occurs under this assumption). Multiplying by 3 yields 
^It+l - fit»'' • - #-) + - «t+l) «8) 
lt+1 It 
substituting 1/(1+r) for g and rearranging terms gives 
^it+1 ~ ^ it " ^ i^t ~ ^ (1+^ ) ^9Y - " 9Y. ) '^^ t+2 ~ ^ t+1^  '^^ t+2 
it+1 It 
(59) 
Let time periods become very short so that 
dP-i 
- r - [4(%:R7^ "tP") - ?('S^ ,o - 5. ,, ) - § <5. ,„] . (60) 
i^ i^^ i^t+1 »?it 
The rate of change in price equals the rate of interest less a factor 
which reflects the changes in marginal production costs and user costs. 
There is nothing in equation 60 that would keep price from falling. 
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The application of equation 60 is not likely to be possible in a 
short time period. Substantial variations in product prices will 
likely cause wide gyrations from the optimal time path in specific 
years. Analysis in the next section focuses on valuing soil but does 
not consider the time paths of such values. 
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CHAPTER V. CONSERVATION BENEFITS; DATA, ANALYSIS, AND RESULTS 
As noted in the review of the literature, there is little informa­
tion on how erosion affects soil productivity. An important research 
need is to measure and evaluate the damage due to erosion or, conversely, 
the benefits of soil conservation. The application of the economic 
model outlined above meets this need by allowing the calculation of 
implicit soil prices. Such prices can be viewed as measures of erosion-
induced productivity losses or as measures of the benefits of conserva­
tion. This chapter contains a discussion of the data used in the analy­
sis and the method of estimation. Additionally, the hypothesis that soil 
productivity varies by region and that such differences are reflected in 
soil values is tested. The implications for targeting are also 
discussed. 
Data 
The Agricultural Stabilization and Conservation Service (ASCS) oper­
ates offices in some 2700 counties. In 1977, the ASCS began in evalua­
tion of the Agricultural Conservation Program (AGP) using a random sample 
of 171 counties. Data were collected from each of these counties for the 
years 1975-1977 and the early part of 1978. ASCS offices in the selected 
counties supplied information on each soil and water conservation prac­
tice for which cost sharing was provided. The data used here include 
only those observations dealing with sheet and nill erosion. These 
observations include information on the type of practice, the priority 
given the practice in the county, the size and type of farm using the 
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practice, whether long term and/or pooling agreements were involved, the 
total cost of installing the practice, the percentage subsidized, and 
the number of acres treated or served by the practice. Additionally, 
d*ata necessary to use the Universal Soil Loss Equation were obtained 
for each practice and estimates of soil loss before and after practice 
application were calculated. 
Similar information on these counties was obtained in 1981 and 1982. 
However, after the initial (1975-1978) data were obtained and evaluated, 
ACP objectives were modified in an effort to increase program effective­
ness. Legislative changes further altered the program so that data from 
the different time periods likely constitute two different sets of 
information. 
The present research focuses on Iowa and the Corn Belt. Since the 
original sample was evidently drawn on a national rather than a strati­
fied (regional) basis, sample points may not be accurate indicators of 
the desired populations. Additionally, information on every participant 
in a selected group of counties is available, but there is no informa­
tion on nonparticipants. Statistics would be descriptive of those re­
ceiving conservation practice payments but may not apply to other 
farmers in the county. 
Implicit Soil Prices 
Factors affecting price 
It is hypothesized that the implicit price of a ton of soil (.the 
cost of a ton of soil erosion on the benefits of conserving a ton of 
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soil) varies with soil productivity and therefore by soil classification, 
susceptibility to erosion, climate, type of farming, land use and other 
factors impinging on soil productivity. These factors are all used in 
delineating major land resource areas (MLRAs) (Austin, 7). Therefore, 
the price of a ton of soil is expected to vary across MLRAs. In Iowa, 
a ton of soil conserved might be valued quite highly in MLRA 109 where 
soil is thin, less highly in 108 where soils are moderately deep, and 
valued least in 107 where top soils are very deep. Similarly for the 
Com Belt, soils in MLRAs 115 and 116 are not very productive from an 
agricultural point of view, and so conservation of such soils may not be 
very highly valued. Knowledge of where the most valuable soils are in 
terms of conservation benefits has obvious targeting implications. A 
brief description of the MLRAs in Iowa and the Com Belt is provided in 
Table 6. 
Besides regional differences, implicit soil prices and conserva­
tion practices used are likely to be interrelated. Particular practices 
are likely to be well-suited to particular land uses and/or soil pat­
terns. The practices considered herein are predominant in the Com Belt 
and include permanent vegetative cover establishment, terracing, and 
conservation tillage. Permanent vegetative cover practices are not 
likely to be used on highly valued soils since the value of soil produc­
tivity with these practices is usually lessened from that of normal 
agricultural practices. Terracing and conservation tillage are more 
likely to be associated with soils of greater value. 
A third factor hypothesized to be related to the value of 
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Table 6. Characteristics of major land resource areas (Austin, 7) 
Region Location Characteristic 
107 Western Iowa 60% cropland, deep loess hills, steep 
rolling hills, highly erosive. 
108 Central Iowa, Illinois 
109 Southern Iowa, 
Northern Missouri 
111 Indiana, Ohio 
75% cropland, deep loess soils, 
level to rolling hills. 
50% cropland, thin loess soils, roll­
ing to undulating slopes 
80% cropland, gently sloping, some 
hills. 
113 Northeast Missouri, 
Western Illinois 
60% cropland, level to gently slop­
ing, clay pan. 
114 Southern Illinois, 
Indiana 
115 Central Mississippi Valley 
(IL, IND, MO) 
50% cropland, moderately thick loess 
soils, level to gently sloping ridge-
tops, narrow flood plains with steep 
valley sides. 
40% cropland, rolling ridge tops, 
steep ridge and valley sides are 
wooded 
116 Southern Missouri 
(Ozarks) 
20% cropland, deeply weathered lime­
stone, some steep slopes 
122 Southern Indiana 40% cropland, level with some areas 
of steep hills and narrow valleys 
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conserving a ton of soil is the prepractice erosion rate. The value of 
a ton of soil subject to extreme erosion might be expected to be less 
than that of a ton which differs only in its susceptibility to erosion. 
The less erosive soil is likely to remain in production longer or re­
quire less investment to maintain it in production so it will be more 
valuable. Since a farmer will have to take costly conservation measures 
to maintain erosion soil in place, the value of an erosive soil is 
likely to be less than that of soil not requiring treatment, other things 
equal. 
It may also be argued that soils that are being allowed to erode 
rapidly are those that are less favorable to crop production and other 
agricultural uses. The inherent productivity is less, so farmers are 
willing to pay a premium for better, less erosive land. The premium is 
paid only if the productivity benefits so obtained are greater than those 
which could be obtained by fertilizing, installing conservation prac­
tices, or otherwise treating the poorer land at a similar cost. 
Estimated prices 
The implicit prices are calculated based on the assumption that 
farmers are economically rational. If a farmer had perfect knowledge 
of the impact of erosion on future productivity and followed optimal 
decision rules (equations 48 and 49), then marginal costs (including user 
costs) would be equated to marginal benefits (including changes in an 
intertemporal production function) in making all production decisions. 
Although perfect knowledge does not exist, farmers have an incentive. 
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as discussed earlier, to make decisions incorporating long-run consider­
ations. It is likely, therefore, that some measure of user cost is 
included in the assessment of marginal cost and that intertemporal 
effects are included in evaluating marginal benefits. The decision 
rules represented by equations 48 and 49 are, therefore, approximated. 
That is, marginal costs in the present period plus user costs are 
equated to discounted marginal benefits. In terms of conservation 
practices, a practice is used up to the point where marginal cost just 
equals marginal benefits. 
8Yi 
In equation 49, let be soil erosion and be the amount of 
soil saved by the last unit of a conservation practice, is the 
implicit price of a ton of soil erosion, and -P^ is the implicit price 
of a ton of soil conserved using practice . This is the amount a 
farmer is willing to pay for a ton of soil conserved. It is assumed 
that farmers consider the long-run impacts of present practices so that 
the dynamic criteria are approximated and implicit prices reflect those 
derived in a dynamic framework. 
9Yi 
In order to derive estimates of and R., several assumptions 
dAj J 
are necessary. First, it is assumed that the onsite marginal products 
of a practice are constant for all acres in a given observation. Since 
the number of acres served by the various practices in a particular 
observation is generally less than 30, it seems likely that the area 
treated is relatively homogeneous. If this is the case, the amount of 
erosion reduction per acre will be the same for each acre treated. 
Second, it is assumed that marginal costs are constant. The farmer 
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does not affect input prices. Since land is homogeneous, marginal 
costs will be equal to average costs. 
Third, the onsite marginal products of the various practices are 
similar when prepractice erosion rates are the same. 
The data were grouped by prepractice erosion rates and the average 
reduction in erosion as well as average practice costs per acre at 
each rate were calculated. Following the approach used in the ACP 
evaluation, the costs were annualized by amortizing the total costs of 
installing the practice at 8% over a three-year period for permanent 
vegetative cover and over a 20-year period for terracing. Although 
the actual data are averages ($/acre and tons/acre), they may be con­
sidered marginal given the assumptions above. They are also marginal in 
the sense that in going from one level of erosion to another, an addi­
tional C tons/acre of soil are saved at a cost of R per ton. 
Using the cost and erosion reduction figures as measures of marginal 
costs and marginal products, the implicit price of a ton of soil con­
served was calculated for the 22 different prepractice erosion rates 
defined in Table 7 by MLRA. Equations 19 and 20 were employed to ob­
tain implicit prices at both farmer and societal levels. For example, 
the average erosion reduction on soils with prepractice erosion rates 
between 10 and 11 (group 10) in MLRA 108 was 6.27. The average cost 
per ton of erosion reduction to the farmer was $39.29. The implicit 
R 39.29 
farm value of a ton of soil saved is therefore $6.27 ~ ~ 6 11^  ' 
The 1981-1982 period implicit prices for MLRAs in Iowa are shown 
in Table 8. Calculated prices from the 1975-1978 period exhibit 
0 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
75 
Prepractice erosion rate groups 
Prepractice Prepractice 
erosion Group erosion 
rate rate 
z < 1 11 11 < z < 12 
1 < z < 2 12 12 < z < 13 
2 i z < 3 13 13 z < 14 
3 -< z < 4 14 14 z < 15 
4 ^  z < 5 15 15 < z < 20 
5 < z < 6 20 20 < z < 25 
6 < z < 7 25 25 < z < 30 
7 < z < 8 30 30 < z < 50 
8 z < 9 50 50 < z < 75 
9 3 z < 10 75 75 < z < 100 
10 < z < 11 99 z > 100 
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Table 8. Implicit price of a ton of soil by Major Land Resource Area 
and prepractice erosion rate in Iowa—1981-1982 
Prepractice Farmer value Societal value 
erosion 
rate 
MLRA MLRA MLRA MLRA MLRA MLRA 
107 108 109 107 108 109 
0 42.30 78.91 
1 7.18 11.05 
2 2.91 3.84 5.06 11.57 7.68 8.77 
3 1.24 4.14 3.01 7.95 
4 22.01 4.20 2.65 44.03 9.58 4.99 
5 2.08 2.14 3.19 3.98 
6 1.28 1.70 2.32 3.38 
7 3.30 2.03 5.89 • 7.56 4.40 11.78 
8 3.21 2.20 .81 6.42 4.87 1.49 
9 1.17 .77 1.10 2.33 1.82 2.03 
10 .69 6.27 1.63 1.37 8.40 3.15 
11 .98 2.08 1.45 3.59 
12 .78 .85 1.56 1.35 
13 .80 1.09 1.60 2.02 
14 .55 .49 .85 1.29 1.05 1.46 
15 1.37 .60 .53 2.59 1.16 1.33 
20 1.37 .40 .59 2.60 .81 1.00 
25 .98 .35 .58 2.04 .52 1.16 
30 .44 .26 .75 .86 .54 1.18 
50 .26 .51 
75 .35 .70 
99 .10 .06 .24 .14 
77 
similar patterns but are not presented. 
The results imply that at present cost share rates, society values 
a ton of soil conserved roughly twice as highly as individual farmers. 
That is, total offsite costs including valuation of all forms of market 
failure are approximately equal to onsite costs. The private valuation 
of land based on its productivity will lead to the same relative values 
across areas as does a societal valuation—at least in the region under 
consideration. 
In general, the value of a ton of soil saved declines as the pre-
practice erosion rate increases. This is in agreement with the 
hypothesized effect. It was also hypothesized that conserved soils 
would be more highly valued in 109 than in 107. Examination of the 
results in Table 8 indicates that this is the case on the less erosive 
soils. 
The use of conservation practices is quite region specific. In 
Iowa, 89% of the terracing occurs in MLRA 107, while 77% of conservation 
tillage practices are in 108 and 75% of all permanent vegetative cover 
observations are in 109. 
Preliminary estimates of implicit soil prices indicate that the 
marginal ton of soil saved by terracing in a particular region is more 
highly valued than that saved by conservation tillage and these are 
both more valuable than a ton of soil saved using permanent vegetative 
cover. While differences across regions were expected, the extent of 
the intraregional variances was surprising. If the value of the soil 
saved by terracing in regions 108 and 109 is greater than that saved by 
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permanent vegetative cover, why is terracing not the predominant prac­
tice form? 
One possible explanation is that soils are not homogeneous, even 
within the groupings considered. An additional unit of terracing within 
a prepractice erosion rate group in 108 or 109 may have higher marginal 
costs or lower marginal benefits. In 107, marginal costs and/or benefits 
may be relatively constant over a wide range. The fact that conserva­
tion tillage and permanent vegetative cover are not used equally within 
108 and 109 may be based on a similar argument. Thus, within an erosion 
rate group, soils may vary in value so that practices differing in cost 
can be used on the 'same' soil. Aggregating on prepractice erosion 
rates across all practices puts soils of differing values together and 
biases comparisons across regions. 
A second form of bias arises from the nature of the costs used in 
estimating the implicit soil prices. These costs are exclusive of 
technical assistance and indirect costs arising from practice usage. It 
is possible that conservation tillage and permanent vegetative cover 
practices reduce normal operating costs (labor and fuel savings in par­
ticular) while terracing increases them (Miranowski et al., 91). Thus, 
the soil prices estimated when only installation costs are used may be 
over- or underestimates of actual soil values. Assuming that indirect 
costs or cost savings associated with a given conservation practice are 
similar across all major land resource areas, a more accurate model of 
soil values would compare the implicit prices associated with terracing 
in one region to those associated with terracing in another and 
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similarly for other practices. This would also account for lack of 
homogeneity in erosion rate groupings. 
One other change can be made to improve the model. The numbers 
used to represent marginal costs and marginal products are aggregated 
averages over all observations at a particular erosion rate. In order 
to determine whether or not soil price differences are significant, the 
original unaggregated data need to be used. A model of soil values can 
then be estimated econometrically using such data. Hypothesis testing 
procedures can be performed to assess the accuracy of the model. 
Statistical tests are explained in the next section. 
The data in Table 8 indicate that soil values are negatively re­
lated to the prepractice erosion rate. This may be because less erosive 
soils are more productive, or stay in production longer, or because such 
soils are less costly to farm. A plot of the data in Table 8 in price-
prepractice erosion rate space suggests the functional form of an equa­
tion expressing price as a function of the erosion rate. Let ER be a 
variable representing the prepractice erosion rate and let P be the 
estimated value of a ton of soil conserved calculated for each observa­
tion. For small values of ER, ER ^ approximates P. As ER increases, 
ER  ^adds explanatory power. It is hypothesized that land use, soil, 
climate and other differences can be accounted for using major land re­
source areas. Therefore, regional dummy variables are included in the 
model. Dummy variables are also used to allow practices to vary with 
soil values. The differential effect of the erosion rate variables 
across regions is included by using an interaction term between these 
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variables and the regional dummies. 
The resulting equation for Iowa is; 
P = a + + g^ DlO? + B^ D107ER"^  + e^ Dl07ER~^ ''^  
+ 0gDlO7P4 + 8^ 0108 + ggD108ER"l + 3^ qD108ER~^ ''^  
+ 3^ D^108P4 + BigDlO&PlS (61) 
where variables are as defined in Table 9. Since three major land re­
source areas are represented, the regional dummy for region 109 is 
excluded to avoid perfect collinearity. Estimated coefficients on 
the dummy variables measure deviations in value from that in region 
109. This approach assumes that the error term has a constant variance 
across regions and prepractice erosion rates. Although the data are 
cross sectional, there does not appear to be a good reason to expect 
heteroscedasticity to be a problem for values arising from different 
regions. However, the data appear to indicate that prices are more 
variable on lower erosive than higher erosive soils. The Goldfeld-
Quandt test was used to test the null hypothesis that the variance was 
-1 proportional to ER . The hypothesis was rejected. Therefore, it was 
assumed that the error structure was homoscedastic. 
Equation 61 was estimated using the Iowa observations in the 
1975-1978 data set, the 1981-1982 data set, and a pooled set. An F-test 
indicated that there was a significant difference between the restricted 
and unrestricted sums of squares. Therefore, the hypothesis of a common 
population was rejected and results from the separate regressions are 
reported. 
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Table 9- Definition of variables used in regression analysis 
Variable Definition 
P Estimated value of a ton of soil conserved 
ER~^  Inverse of the prepractice erosion rate 
ER-2 Inverse of the square of the prepractice erosion 
rate 
P49 Practice dummy for terracing in region 109 (0,1) 
P159 Practice duminy for conservation tillage in region 109 
(0,1) 
Di* 
DiER~^  
DiER~^  
Regional dummy; 1 if region i, 0 otherwise 
-1 
Product of Di and ER 
_2 
Product of Di and ER 
DiP4 Practice dummy for terracing in region i (0,1) 
DiP15 Practice dummy for conservation tillage in region i 
(0,1) 
i^ = 107, 108, 111, 113, 114, 115, 116, 122—the major land 
resource areas in the Com Belt. 
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Iowa 
The regression results for Iowa (Table 10) show that a number of 
variables in the 1975-1978 model are not statistically significant. F-
tests indicate that implicit prices in regions 107 and 109 are signifi­
cantly different. Furthermore, terracing and permanent vegetative cover 
practices are used on soils of significantly different values. The re­
sults of the 1981-1982 estimation are not as clear cut. While no single 
variable is significant at a level of significance less than .08, sig­
nificant differences in prices in regions 107 and 109 do exist. The 
2 
relatively high R coupled with the low t-values suggests the presence 
of multicollinearity. Alternative model specifications all resulted in 
similar collinearity problems. 
Estimated implicit soil prices using the coefficients in Table 10 
indicate that for the 1975-1978 period, soils saved using permanent 
vegetative cover were most highly valued in region 107 and least in 
region 108. With terracing, soils in 109 had the lowest price. The 
1981-1982 results were quite different. Implicit soil prices using 
permanent vegetative cover were least in 107 and greatest in 109. With 
terracing, soils were valued most highly in 108 and least in 107. If 
more accurate (efficient) funding resulted from program changes in the 
latter period, this regression may be a more accurate indicator of cur­
rent soil values. While the 1981-1982 data support the hypothesized 
relationships, the earlier data do not. Given the program changes and 
the difficulty of interpreting coefficients when multicollinearity 
exists, it is doubtful whether any useful information sufficient to 
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Table 10. Results of Iowa Soil Conservation price estimation 
1975-1978 1981-1982 
Variable Coeffi- t- Coeffi- t-
cient ratio cient ratio 
Intercept .14 
00 
1.12 1.26 
ER~^  4.10 3.64 6.06 1.78 
ER"^  -1.43 -2.47 1.16 1.38 
D107 -.24 -.34 -1.13 -.49 
-1 
D107ER 6.89 1.35 -4.27 -1.07 
D107ER"^  1.03 .71 -1.05 -1.24 
D107P4 3.23 5.03 -.26 -.12 
D108 -.51 -.37 -1.04 -.16 
D108ER"^  -6.55 -.29 -1.29 -.05 
D108ER"^  38.49 .44 -3.12 -.04 
D108P4 4.07 4.86 1.34 .22 
D108P15 1.42 1.50 .18 .03 
D109P4 1.77 1.74 -.90 -.33 
.26 .68 
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accept or reject hypothesized relationships arises from this approach. 
It can be noted, however, that in alternative tests with aggregated 
data, hypothesized relationships could not be rejected. 
Corn Belt 
The same procedure of estimating implicit prices and testing for 
significance was carried out using information for the Corn Belt. All 
observations from the states of Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Missouri and 
Ohio, representing the major land resource areas described in Table 6, 
were used. The differences in the values of a ton of soil conserved 
across practices are similar to those discussed above. An expanded, 
modified version of equation 61 which contained variables for the regions 
in the Corn Belt was estimated using data from the 1975-1978 and 1981-1982 
samples. Again, the hypothesis of a common population was rejected so 
that separate regressions for each period were used. The null hypothesis 
of homoscedasticity was not rejected. The results are displayed in 
Table 11. 
A number of variables do not appear to be significant. However, 
F-tests on variable groupings by region indicate that prices are usually 
significantly different from those in region 109. In the 1975-1978 
model, prices in regions 107, 114, 115 and 122 are significantly dif­
ferent at a level of .01 while those in regions 108, 111 and 116 are 
different at a level of .05. Differences between prices in 109 and 113 
are not significant. F-tests on the 1981-1982 model found no statisti­
cally significant differences between region 109 prices and those in 
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Table 11. Results of Com Belt soil conservation price estimation 
Variable 1975-1978 1981--1982 Coeffi­ t- Coeffi- t-
cient ratio cient ratio 
Constant 1.10 2.89 1.82 2.97 
ER-1 .52 .35 7.38 12.06 
ER-2 1.05 1.98 -.16 -11.97 
D107 , -1.20 —. 81 -1.83 -.44 
D107ER 10.47 .97 -5.59 -1.37 
D107ER-2 -1.43 -.50 .27 1.68 
D107P4 3.23 2.34 -.26 -.06 
D108 -1.70 -.64 -.52 — .18 
D108ER-1 12.11 .26 -13.17 -1.22 
D108ER-2 3.76 .02 15.22 2.32 
D108P4 2.19 1.80 .55 .19 
D108P15 -.33 -.12 
Dili , .53 .24 -.99 -.51 
DlllER .89 .11 .27 .03 
DlllER-2 4.51 .81 -.74 -.25 
D111P4 -.61 -.10 
D111P15 -.52 -.27 
D113 -1.33 -1.02 -.95 -.46 
D113ER~^  16.81 1.74 -3.48 -.52 
D113ER-2 -11.77 -1.21 4.51 1.31 
D113P4 -.54 -.34 1.12 .45 
D113P15 1.35 .39 
D114 
D114ER"! 
1.40 1.63 -3.21 -1.09 
8.17 4.72 5.86 2.49 
D114ER-2 -.75 -1.37 -.37 -1.50 
D114P4 2.57 .56 
D114P15 4.46 1.53 
D115 , -.24 -.10 .36 .33 
D115ER , -19.66 -1.31 -11.99 -16.00 
D115ER" 46.82 2.55 .26 18.96 
D115P4 .95 .41 -1.83 -1.56 
D116 
D116ER 1 
-1.36 -1.87 -2.06 -1.09 
7.29 2.77 6.12 .29 
D116ER-2 -3.30 -2.66 -9.96 -.31 
D116P4 .21 .07 
D122 -4.44 -6.59 -2.36 -1.45 
D122ER~ 17.86 10.67 36.66 3.15 
D122ER"^  -4.12 -7.68 14.36 4.01 
D122P15 -.74 -.27 
P49 -.47 -.73 -5.02 -4.21 
P159 -1.93 -.62 
R2 .55 .82 
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regions 111, 113 and 116. Prices significantly different at the .01 
level characterized regions 114, 115 and 122, while 107 and 108 were 
at .05. 
Terracing is used on soils whose prices differ significantly from 
those where permanent vegetative cover is employed. However, the dif­
ference in soil prices where permanent vegetative cover or conserva­
tion tillage practices were used is not statistically significant. 
It would be possible to calculate implicit soil prices at all 
levels of erosion for each region-practice combination and trace out 
a curve in dollar-erosion rate space. The envelope of all such curves 
would represent the highest value of soil savings at a given erosion 
rate. The highest point on the envelope curve would be a point on a 
particular region practice curve and would represent the value of soil 
savings gained from using the practice in that region on soils eroding 
at the indicated rate. Successively lesser-valued soils are saved by 
moving down the curve. Administrators of soil conservation programs 
could focus efforts on the most highly-valued soils using the best 
practice. 
Such a process is not likely to be followed for several reasons. 
First, it is politically infeasible. Such an approach would eliminate 
cost sharing in broad areas—a practice not likely to be approved by 
Congress. Second, the accuracy of the data is suspect due to the aggre­
gation of practices and soils within regions. The accuracy is insuffi­
cient to justify such hairline targeting. 
As an alternative, the estimates of the implicit soil prices by 
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region can be found for given prepractice erosion rates using the coeffi­
cients in Table 11. These can be ranked to see which region has the 
least (most) valuable soil on average. The rankings vary little up to 
10 tons/acre. Calculating the implicit price of a ton of soil at an 
erosion rate of 5 tons leads to the regional rankings by practice pre­
sented below. 
For permanent vegetative cover practices, implicit soil prices 
from low to high order the regions as 
115 122 116=109 107=108=111 113 114 (1975-1978) 
107 108 114=115 113 116 111 109 122 (1981-1982). 
For terracing, it is 
115 109 113 114 108 107 (1975-1978) 
109 107 115 108 111 116 113 114 122 (1981-1982). 
The conservation tillage practice was used only in the latter period. 
The regional ranking is 
108 111=109 113 114 (1981-1982). 
Although the rankings vary somewhat by practices and between time peri­
ods, there is sufficient similarity to conclude that soils saved in 
regions 111, 113 and 114 are most valuable while those in 115 are among 
the least valuable. To the extent that the ACP evaluation and result­
ing program changes reflect increased efficiency of conservation fund 
usage, more weight may be given the latter period values. The policy 
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significance of these results is presented in more detail in the next 
section. 
Policy Implications and Limitations 
The efforts of physical scientists have increased public awareness 
of the extent of the erosion problem. However, the increased awareness 
has been limited to knowledge of the amount of soil moving. Moving soil 
has been considered "lost" even though the soil is usually still in use 
further down the slope. It has also been assumed that all soils are 
equally valuable. Therefore, targeting efforts have focused on the most 
erosive soils. 
Economic criteria suggest that funds should be used in such a way as 
to get the greatest possible benefit from the last dollar spent. 
Although conservationists have focused on increasing the cost effective­
ness of conservation programs, cost effectiveness has been in terms of 
tons of soil saved per dollar. This is an improvement over random or 
broad-based spending patterns but still does not accord with what is 
economically optimal. An optimal decision rule requires marginal costs 
to be equated to marginal benefits with benefits and costs measured in 
comparable units. Recent efforts to assess productivity losses due to 
erosion (conservation benefits) have attempted to do this by measuring 
the amount of soil moving and then estimating the impacts of such move­
ments on crop yields. While additional research of this variety is 
needed, this is not the only approach to the problem. In fact,changes 
in prices may render moot the impact of erosion on yields given present 
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technologies since new methods will likely be innovated to economize on 
scarce factors. An alternate method of measuring costs associated with 
erosion is to examine how much farmers are willing to pay to stop it. 
This research proposes such a measure. It is shown that benefits are not 
constant over all regions. 
Areas with abundant soil or less productive soils are generally 
areas of lower soil conservation prices, whereas areas with highly pro­
ductive thin soils or soils that are erosive and more productive but 
moderately thick have higher conservation values. If a ton of soil 
conservation could be achieved at equal cost, the higher-valued areas 
should receive the subsidies. 
To the extent that benefit measures derived above are accurate, 
these results suggest that federal funding of soil conservation practices 
should not be subject to pork barrel allocation methods, nor should it 
be based on gross soil erosion estimates. Rather, a truly cost effec­
tive program would target funds to areas losing the most productivity. 
When the area of interest is the Com Belt, major land resource area 115 
is not a high priority area, while areas 111, 113 and 114 are. Conserva­
tion assistance to farmers in major land resource areas 111, 113 and 114 
will secure more benefits than targeting to other areas even though ero­
sion is more severe elsewhere. The economic criteria thus suggest that 
serious erosion problem areas need not be the areas with the greatest 
amount of erosion. 
It was hypothesized that within the state of Iowa, the focus of 
conservation efforts would be in the south central counties (MLRA 109) 
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where soil is thin, yet marginal productivity is high. Although erosion 
in terms of tons of soil moving is greatest in western Iowa (MLRA 107), 
the greatest conservation benefits accrue to a ton of soil saved in the 
thin-soiled areas. The evidence on this hypothesis was mixed so that 
a clear conclusion was not forthcoming. 
A similar analysis could be performed for other regions and states. 
State and federal committees and agencies responsible for allocating 
conservation assistance funds would then have some basis on which to 
make funding decisions. Funding of projects in particular areas could 
be justified so that present broad-based funding could be cut back more 
easily. Programs such as the Conservation Technical Assistance program 
could more accurately target funds using this methodology and hopefully 
withstand political pressure that seems to be turning this targeting 
program into another broad-based 'fund a bit everywhere' program. 
If the justification of conservation spending is to reduce the 
impact of erosion on productivity, then the approach outlined above can 
be usefully applied to discover where productivity losses are greatest. 
In the areas examined here, relative prices of soils were roughly the 
same from both social and private points of view so that targeting on 
the basis of productivity losses satisfies the societal optima. Where 
significant differences in offsite costs exist, productivity values may 
be offset so that targeting based on societal prices differs from that 
based on private productivity based prices. 
The existence of analytical problems prohibits the above approach 
from being the sole provider of information for targeting decisions. 
90b 
Nevertheless, the insights gained would appear to be significant in 
improving present conservation funding methods. 
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CHAPTER VI. THE ADOPTION OF CONSERVATION PRACTICES 
The analysis above provides insight into where conservation funds 
should be invested. This chapter focuses on factors related to the 
decision of which practice to use given that conservation occurs. 
A number of studies have attempted to model the adoption process 
associated with conservation practice usage. The goal has usually been 
to understand characteristics associated with adopters (or constraints 
imposed on nonadopters) so that policy changes can be made to increase 
program effectiveness. As noted in Chapter III, the idea of targeting 
soil conservation efforts to achieve the maximum amount of benefits has 
typically focused on increasing conservation on those soils where 
erosion is greatest. An alternative economic criterion discussed in 
Chapters IV and V suggests focusing on those soils with the largest 
conservation benefits in terms of productivity saved. A method of 
determining conservation benefits was proposed and applied to soils in 
the Corn Belt and in Iowa. However, given the voluntary nature of 
present government programs, farmers in specific areas or with cer­
tain characteristics may be more likely than others to engage in ero­
sion control. Government subsidies or aid might be targeted to such 
individuals. This reasoning accounts for the criteria in the CTA pro­
gram mentioned earlier which considers willingness of farmers to 
participate in the determination of where to target investment funds. 
Researchers have hypothesized that certain factors affect the adoption 
decision; then proceeded to empirically test such hypotheses (Ervin and 
Ervin, 50; Miranowski et al., 91; Boron, 15; Lee and Stewart, 79). 
92 
Previous studies examining the adoption decision have not considered 
the choice among practices once a decision to adopt has been made. 
Previous conservation practice adoption studies are reviewed in 
this section. It is shown that the seemingly ad hoc nature of the 
studies can be traced to a theoretical foundation. That theory and the 
relevant estimation procedures are discussed. A model is developed to 
examine the effect of physical characteristics on the decision of which 
soil conservation practice to adopt given that adoption occurs. The 
results of applying the model to the 1981-1982 Com Belt data 
described above are presented and policy implications are briefly 
reviewed. 
Previous Studies 
Ervin and Ervin (50) provide a review of previous research, then 
Incorporate hypotheses from earlier studies into an integrated model. 
They use an ordinary least squares estimation technique to measure the 
effect of various personal, Institutional, economic and physical factors 
on a farmer's perception of erosion problems, his decision to use 
conservation practices, and the amount of soil conservation effort 
undertaken. The study uses sample data from a Missouri county. Three 
equations corresponding to the perception, decision and effort components 
above were estimated. Perception of a problem was hypothesized to be 
positively correlated with erosion potential (KLS), education, a con­
servation attitude index, a farm orientation Index, and whether or not 
a farmer was an SCS cooperator, had a farm conservation plan or farmed 
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in an organized watershed. No economic factors were considered. The 
decision to use a conservation practice and the level of effort were 
represented by the number of practices used and the difference between 
the farm erosion rate with conservation practices and the farm erosion 
rate without such practices. These variables were regressed on all of 
the dependent variables from the perception model as well as on percent 
of land receiving cost sharing, the percent of income due to off farm 
sources, a debt concern index, a risk aversion index, total cropland 
fanned, and dummy variables representing (1) an intention to transfer 
the farm to a child and (2) cash grain operations. Despite the large 
number of variables, only 25-30 percent of the variability of the de­
pendent variables was explained. Erosion potential, education, the risk 
aversion index, the cash grain farm dummy, and the cost share variables 
were significant at the .10 level. 
The Ervin and Ervin model has a number of problems. The dependent 
variables are proxies of questionable nature and so-called economic 
factors are not represented by economic variables. Some qualitative 
information is forthcoming, but no quantitative measures are developed. 
The study does note that SCS cooperation, farm conservation plans and 
organized watersheds are not significantly associated with increases in 
any of the three dependent variables. 
Mlranowski et al. (91) estimated a linear probability model using 
survey data from an Iowa watershed. The probability that a farmer uses 
a primary tillage practice other than moldboard plow was hypothesized 
to be a positive function of education, experience, tenure status, crop 
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rotations, and field type (slope). The probability of adoption was 
hypothesized to be negatively related to changes in yields and risk. 
The effect of farm size was a priori unknown. A great deal of vari­
ability was unexplained by the model, but some interesting results 
were obtained. While most variables had the expected sign, farm size 
was found to be negatively correlated with adoption. Education and 
field type were quite significant while the risk variable was not. 
The incorporation of risk using farmers' perceptions of yield differ­
ences associated with practices and the inherent riskiness of tillage 
practices was novel. However, the small number of observations limited 
statistical analysis. 
Boron (15) used a logit model to identify differences in land 
ownership characteristics between farmers who invested in soil conserva-
tin and farmers who did not. His analysis focused on farmers in four 
regions of the central United States and considered tenure status, 
amount of land farmed, land value, owner's age and level of education 
and net farm income. He hypothesized that (1) owners who operate part 
or all of their land are more likely to invest in conservation than 
owners who rent out all of their land; (2) landlords who use share rental 
leases are more likely to invest in conservation than landlords who use 
cash rental leases; and (3) the amount of land farmed, land value, and 
net farm income are positively linked to adoption but that age has a 
negative value. The model was applied to each region separately. While 
results vary somewhat by region, the probability of investment in con­
servation practices was positively correlated with education and acres 
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owned and negatively correlated with age. In three of the four regions, 
including the Com Belt, owners who operated part of their land or 
used share leases on land rented out were much more likely to invest 
in conservation than owners using only cash leases. Boron did not 
measure the extent of adoption, nor was conservation practice well-
defined. Farmers were considered adopters if they answered affirma­
tively when asked if they invested in conservation practices 'such as 
terraces, grass waterways, or gully control'. While region specific 
estimation was performed, there was no attempt to verify whether 
regional differences were sufficient to justify such a procedure. Ad­
ditionally, there was no attempt to hold erosivity constant, which may 
invalidate most of his results. 
Lee and Stewart (79) used a logit model to estimate the proportion 
of farms with specified characteristics that adopted minimum tillage. 
Characteristics considered included tenure status, farm size, erosion 
potential, region and organizational structure. They found that full 
owner operators and land owners with small holdings have lower adoption 
rates than other groups. Organizational structure had no significant 
impact. Regional effects were the most important factors explaining 
minimum tillage adoption. Again, no quantitative measures of the 
importance of explanatory variables were forthcoming. Furthermore, 
minimum tillage was considered in the absence of any other conservation 
practice. 
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Theoretical Basis of Adoption Models 
The above models and other adoption models are often perceived as 
being ad hoc and resting on no theoretical foundation (Ervin and Ervin, 
50; Feder, 51). The lack of formal models is not surprising given the 
nature of the problem. However, it can be shown that a formal model 
does underlie such efforts. The adoption process is a problem of choice 
under conditions of uncertainty. Such a portfolio selection problem can 
be solved given the farmer's utility function (embodying risk prefer­
ences), his choices and accompanying constraints, and the domain and 
distribution of future events (Miranowski et al., 91). This economic 
model of individual behavior allows calculation of optimal amounts of 
consumption and production by households and firms when a continuum of 
choices is available. Researchers have assumed a profit maximizer exists 
that selects practices based on costs and returns. Average population 
behavior can be derived from a random sample of individuals in such a 
programming approach. Policy changes influencing adoption can be 
modeled directly so that quantitative measures of erosion control are 
forthcoming. However, the data on individual utility functions and risk 
preferences required to perform such analyses are not available. Hypo­
thetical situations can be modeled but the results may be of dubious 
value to policy makers. 
When data requirements of the programming method are not met or 
when choices are discrete, population behavior can be described only in 
probabilistic terms. The econometric problem becomes one of modeling 
the selection probabilities, then determining the implications for 
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choice. This is the basis for the above models. Statistical analysis 
relates the conditional probability of a particular choice to attri­
butes of the alternatives and/or characteristics of decision makers 
(Judge et al., 72). In this case, the direction of the effect of 
policy changes is usually all that can be determined. The magnitude of 
any changes is generally unknown. Two problems remain: (1) what 
statistical methods are available? and (2) what attributes or character­
istics should be included as explanatory variables? 
Statistical methods 
The adoption studies reviewed above use various statistical tech­
niques to link attributes to decisions and derive the associated proba­
bilities. Usually adoption is viewed as an either-or decision. A 
farmer either adopts a particular practice or he does not. While the 
rate of adoption may be modeled using a linear probability model, the 
dichotomous nature of the dependent variable leads to problems of 
heteroscedasticity and the possibility that predictions may not make 
sense (outside a 0-1 range). If few or only one observation per setting 
of the independent variables are available, it is not possible to cor­
rect for heteroscedasticity. This is the case when continuous explana­
tory variables are used. The simple logit model overcomes these 
problems at some expense. The technique estimates the log of the 
odds that a particular choice is made using a maximum likelihood ap­
proach. However, if a farmer can choose among several alternatives, 
the simple logit model is also inappropriate because probabilities are 
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not constrained to sum to one. Two other statistical techniques exist 
which can be used—the multinomial logit and the multinomial probit. 
The multinomial logit approach assumes that alternatives are independent. 
The odds of a particular dichotomous choice must be unaffected as addi­
tional alternatives are added (Judge et al., 72). If alternatives are 
close substitutes, this assumption may be violated. The multinomial 
probit does not have this limitation. However, it has been used little 
due to computational difficulties. Although recent efforts have 
developed computational procedures, it is more expensive than multinomial 
logit and the additional benefits derived are questionable (Judge et al., 
72). The adoption of conservation practices is modeled below with the 
multinomial logit approach because (1) one observation per setting rules 
out linear probability; (2) multiple choices eliminate the simple logit 
model; and (3) a multinomial logit procedure was obtainable at low cost 
and differences in results from multinomial logit and probit models 
have been small in past studies (Judge et al., 72). 
Explanatory variables 
McFadden (87) has derived the multinomial, or what he terms the 
conditional logit model in a utility maximization framework. Following 
McFadden, let X denote the universe of choices, and A the universe of 
measured attributes associated with decision makers. A randomly selected 
individual will face some subset of choices CeX and will have an attri­
bute vector aeA. Let P(x|a,C) be the conditional probability that x is 
chosen given a and C. Define a model of individual behavior as a set 
of rules R with r being an individual behavior rule describing a choice 
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in C given a. If R describes a population, then there exists a proba­
bility p which specifies the distribution of behavior rules in the 
population. The probability that an individual drawn at random will 
choose X given a and C equals the probability of the occurrence of a 
decision rule yielding this choice (McFadden, 87). That is 
P(x|a,C) = p[reR r(a,C)=x] . (62a) 
Let an individual's utility function be represented by 
U = V(a,x) + e(a,x) (62b) 
where V is nonstochastic and reflects representative tastes of the 
population. The term e is stochastic and reflects individual taste 
peculiarities. The probability that an individual utility maximizer 
drawn at random from the population will choose is 
?! = P^ (x|a,C) = p[reR|r (a,C) = x^ ] (63) 
= p[e(a,x ) - e(a,x.) < v(a,x.) - v(a,x.) for all j^ l] . 
J 1 i J 
There exists, then, a joint cumulative distribution function 
F(e^  ... e^ ) = p[reR|e(a,Xj) < e for j=l ... J].(64) 
Let be the partial derivative of F with respect to its ith argu­
ment and let = V(a,x^ ). Then, equation 63 becomes 
F (e + V. - V , ... , e + V. - V.) de . (65) 
e=-oo 1 1 J- 1 J 
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If alternatives are independent 
P(y|a, (x,y))/P(x|a,(x,y)) = P(y|a,C)/P(x|a,C) . (59) 
That is, the odds of y being chosen over x in a multiple choice situ­
ation C equals the odds of a binary choice of y over x. Assuming 
(P /p ) 
P(x|a,C)>0 letting p = P(x|a,(x,y)), p /p = and 
xy yx xy •^^ xz'^ zx-' 
V(a,x,z) = logCP^ /^Pg^ ) where z is a reference member of C, then it 
can be shown (McFadden, 87) that 
P(x|a,C) = exp[v(a,x,z)]/Zy^ 2 exp[v(z,y,z)] . (60) 
If V(a,x,z) = v(a,x) - v(a,z), then equation 60 becomes 
P(x|a,C) = exp[v(a,x)]/Zy2g exp[v(a,y)] . (61) 
McFadden shows that if the error terms in equation 55 are inde­
pendently and identically distributed with the Weibull density func­
tion, then the selection probabilities in equation 58 satisfy equation 
61. If v(a,x) is linear, then 
J , 
P.. = P(x..|a.,Cj = exp(Z B)/ % exp(Z B) . (62) 
IJ 1] J J 
The probability of individual i choosing alternative j is related to a 
vector of observations on variables that are functions of the attri­
butes and/or the individuals (Z^ )^ and an unknown parameter vector B 
to be estimated. When explanatory variables have differential impacts 
upon the odds of choosing one alternative over another, B is alterna­
tive specific. The log odds of alternative j relative to alternative i 
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is 
log[Plj/Pil] = log[exp(Z^ jBj)/exp(Z^ jB^ )] 
= Zl(B. - B^ ) . (70) 
Selection probabilities are 
J 
P. il 
= 1/(1 + I  exp(Z'B.)) 
J=2  ^J 
J 
"ij = exp(Z!B )/(l  + I  exp(Z!B )) .  
 ^ J=2 J 
(71) 
Maximum likelihood estimators of the parameters in equation 71 are 
efficient and normally distributed allowing normal hypothesis testing 
(McFadden). 
This model has been applied in studies of travel demand, occupa­
tional choice, and college attendance among others (Judge et al., 72; 
Maddala, 83). 
The determination of which practice to use once a decision to adopt 
a conservation practice has been made can be modeled using the above 
approach. 
The model is made operational by hypothesizing that various soil 
characteristics affect a farmer's decision to adopt a specific conserva­
tion practice. Differences in soil characteristics can be accounted 
for in several ways. One method would be to differentiate soils by 
major land resource areas as in Chapter V. Lee and Stewart (79) found 
that regional differences account for significant differences in the 
The Choice Among Practices 
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adoption rate of minimum tillage. However, they considered the Corn 
Belt as one region. The emphasis on targeting requires a smaller 
delineation of regions. 
In addition to broad regional differences, adoption rates will 
likely vary within regions with soil characteristics. Intraregion dif­
ferences in soil characteristics are incorporated by considering dif­
ferences in soil classifications, slope, and prepractice erosion rates. 
Structural and social variables hypothesized by others to affect the 
adoption decision will likely be important in the choice of practice too. 
Although such variables are missing from the model, physical character­
istics are likely to account for some of these differences across 
farmers. Since the primary concern is with soil characteristics, only 
limited attempts to include structural characteristics were made. Since 
data on farm size were available in the data set, this variable was in­
cluded. It is possible that farm size picks up a number of other social 
characteristics—income, risk, credit constraints, experience and educa­
tion (Feder, 51; Miranowski et al., 91). The percentage of the prac­
tice costs paid for by government was also included to assess the 
effects of policy on the choice of which practice to use. 
Thus, the Z vector in equation 69 includes regional dummies for 
the MLRAs. The effect of these variables on relative adoption rates 
is a priori unknown. Four variables for farm size are used due to the 
fact that farm size is reported in discrete form. F1 is 1 if farm 
acreage is less than 100 acres, and 0 otherwise. Similarly, F2 repre­
sents farms of 101-300 acres, and F3 denotes farm size of 301-500 
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acres. F4 is excluded to avoid perfect collinearity and represents 
farms larger than 500 acres. Miranowski et al. (91) found farm size 
to be negatively correlated with nonconventional tillage adoption 
while Boron (15) and Lee and Stewart (79) found a positive relation­
ship. It can be argued that larger farms allow a farmer to have ac­
cess to better information. Operators of larger units would therefore 
be aware of profitable practices and leaders in their adoption. How­
ever, the impact of tax policy may mitigate this advantage if the 
practice is capital intensive. Davenport et al. (44) suggest that 
this occurs. Large farms may be less likely to adopt terracing than 
small farms, and more likely to adopt the other practices than are small 
farms due to tax incentives. The delineation between small and large 
is not known and the effect of farm size on adoption is uncertain. 
Three land class variables are used to differentiate soils on the 
basis of productivity. LI and L2 are dummy variables taking the value 
of 1 if soils are in a certain class and 0 otherwise. LI includes 
class I and class II soils. Classes III and IV are in L2. Soils in 
classes VI and VII are in L3, the excluded variable. LI might be ex­
pected to be highly correlated with conservation tillage and less so 
with terracing and permanent vegetative cover since erosion is not a 
limiting factor to production on soils in this category. L2 is ex­
pected to be highly correlated with terracing while L3 is hypothesized 
to be significantly linked to permanent vegetative cover practices. 
In addition to the discrete variables, two continuous variables 
further differentiating soil characteristics are used-slope (S) and 
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prepractice erosion rate (B4L). It is hypothesized that slope and pre-
practice erosion rates are positively related to the adoption of 
terracing and permanent vegetative cover but less important in conserva­
tion tillage adoption. 
The percent of practice cost borne by government (PCT) is included 
to assess the differential effect of subsidies on practice adoption. 
Thus, Z!^ B can be written as 
a + B^ D107 + B^ DIOS + 6^ 0109 + D^ Dlll + B^ D113 + B^ D114 + B^ DllS + BgD116 
+ BgFl + B^ qF2 + B^ F^3 + B^ gLl + B^ L^Z + B^ S^ + B^ gB4L + B^ P^CT . ( 72) 
The constant term includes the excluded variables DI22, F4, and 
L3. The various regional, farm size and soil class variable coeffi­
cients are therefore measures of the differences between the means of 
that category and the excluded variables. 
Estimation of the parameters in equation 72 was carried out by 
maximum likelihood methods. The likelihood function is 
where M is the number of observations and J is the number of alterna­
tives (Judge et al., 72). A computer routine using an unconstrained 
nonlinear optimization procedure, the Newton-Raphson algorithm, was 
applied. The results are in the form of equation 70, the log odds 
of one alternative relative to another, and are shown in Table 12. 
The results show that practice adoption varies by region, land 
J M 
IT ir exp (ZIB. ) 
3=2 i=l  ^J 
(73) 
Table 12. Estimates of coefficients and t ratios^  
Inde- Dependent variables (P./P.)^  
pendent  ^
vari- InCPi/Pg) InCP^ /P^ ) ln(P^ /Pj^ 5) InCP^ /P^ ) InCP^ /P^ s) InCP^ /Pi^ ) 
ables Coeffi- t- Coeffi- t- Coeffi- t- Coeffi- t- Coeffi- t- Coeffi- t— 
cient ratio cient ratio cient ratio cient ratio cient ratio cient ratio 
Constant .32 .75 .48 1.04 -.01 -.02 .16 .29 -.33 -.80 -.49 -1.06 
D107 2.42 2.22 -5.84 -8,91 2.52 2.38 -8.26 -11.23 .10 .16 8.36 11.29 
D108 3.30 4.55 -1.60 -4.22 -2.78 -8.17 -4.90 -8.77 -6.08 -12.70 -1.18 -3.95 
D109 .12 .28 -2.78 -9.04 2.52 5.95 -2.90 -9.32 2.40 5.67 5.30 15.00 
Dill —. 48 -1.08 4.02 5.62 -2.72 -7.81 4.50 6.70 -2.24 -6.73 -6.74 -13.43 
D113 -1.78 -5.44 .34 .97 2.76 6.81 2.12 6.41 4.54 12.29 2.42 5.85 
D114 .62 1.26 1.76 3.51 -2.96 -9.41 1.14 2.25 -3.58 -10.67 -4.72 -12.90 
D115 . 56 1.61 -2.12 -8.02 .36 1.27 -2.68 -9.63 -.20 -.34 2.48 9.29 
D116 .04 .13 1.12 4.18 -.20 -.83 1.08 4.05 -.24 -.96 -1.32 -5.20 
LI 1.54 6.01 -1.86 -6.57 -.24 -1.02 -3.40 -12.58 -1.78 -7.00 1.62 5.55 
L2 .54 3.03 -.64 -2.60 -.24 -1.46 -1.18 5.63 -.78 -4.50 .40 1.14 
F1 -.66 -3.38 .60 2.98 .50 2.99 .06 6.36 1.16 .39 -.10 -.10 
F2 -.22 -1.35 -.30 -1.98 .28 2.10 -.08 -.63 .50 3.65 .58 4.05 
F3 .38 1.59 -.52 -2.90 .24 1.38 -.90 -4.50 -.14 .20 .76 4.30 
POT .42 .39 -.10 -.08 -1.28 -1.23 -.52 -.47 -1.70 -1.62 -1.18 -1.15 
S -.02 -.69 .06 .82 .06 .95 .08 1.64 — 
B4L • • — .01 .45 -.02 -2.37 .01 .40 -.02 -2.30 -.03 
0
 
C
O
 C
M
 1 
C^oefficient divided by asymptotic standard error. 
bp^  - permanent vegetative cover establishment 
P2 - permanent vegetative cover improvement 
P4 - terracing 
Pl5 - conservation tillage. 
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class, farm size and, to a degree, by prepractice erosion rate. The 
coefficient columns show the effect of the independent variables on the 
likelihood of adopting practice i over practice j. The estimation pro­
cedure derives estimates of the asymptotic standard errors which are 
used to calculate 't-ratios' and can be used in hypothesis testing. 
Positive coefficients favor adoption of while negative coefficients 
increase the likelihood of P^ . For example, in the third column (PI/ 
P4), other things being equal, the likelihood of adopting permanent 
vegetative cover establishment compared to terracing increases in 
regions 111 and 114 but decreases in 107, 108, 109 and 115 from that 
in 122. Similarly, if a soil is in land class 3 or 4 (L2), it increases 
the likelihood that terracing will be chosen over permanent vegetative 
cover establishment. The effect is in the same direction but of a 
greater magnitude for soils in land classes 1 and 2 (LI)• Note the 
effect of farm size—the larger the farm, the more likely terracing 
will be chosen. The cost share, slope and erosion rate variables are 
insignificant although in this case (P1/P4) the signs are as expected. 
Slope and erosion rate have a negative impact and subsidies have a posi­
tive effect on the likelihood of adopting terracing over permanent 
vegetative cover. The cost share and slope variables are, in fact, 
insignificant in all equations. The effect of slope may already be 
picked up in the erosion rate and soil class variables. Since the 
sample is composed only of subsidized adopters, and variation in subsidy 
rates has been very small, it may not be surprising that the cost share 
variable has little effect on the choice of practice decision. 
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An analogous interpretation can be made for each equation cor­
responding to a column of coefficients. An alternative method of 
examining the results would be to consider the ordering of practices 
given an independent variable. Consider the land class variable L2. 
Soils in this class increase the likelihood of adopting terraces over 
all other practices. The adoption of conservation tillage is more 
likely than the adoption of either of the permanent vegetative cover 
practices on soils in this class. The results are similar for LI but 
the effect is even greater. Thus, the likelihood of adopting terracing 
and conservation tillage is greatest on the better soils holding all 
other variables constant. 
Examination of the farm size variables in a similar fashion reveals 
that the smallest farms (Fl) are more likely to adopt a permanent vege­
tative cover practice over conservation tillage, and conservation 
tillage over terracing. Farms in the 100-300 acre category (F2) are 
most likely to adopt terracing and least likely to adopt conservation 
tillage. On farms of 300-500 acres, the ordering from most to least 
likely becomes terracing, establishing permanent vegetative cover, 
conservation tillage and improving permanent vegetative cover. The 
erosion rate variable increases the likelihood of adopting conservation 
tillage over permanent vegetative cover and permanent vegetative cover 
over terracing when other factors are constant. 
A similar analysis could be carried out for each region. Alterna­
tively, the estimated probabilities can be calculated using equation 71 
and recalling that the estimated probabilities must sum to one. The 
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estimated probabilities or adoption rates are shown in Table 13 for 
the various farm size and land class combinations. Calculations were 
performed near the means of the continuous variables (PCT = .5, S = 8, 
B4L = 10). 
It is obvious that particular practices are most likely to be 
adopted in particular areas—terracing in regions 107, 109, and 115; 
conservation tillage in 108, 111, 114, and 116; and permanent vege­
tative cover in 113, 116 and 122. 
Since the decision here is which practice to adopt rather than 
whether or not to adopt any practice, comparison of results with other 
studies is limited. However, these results do extend the finding of 
Lee and Stewart that regional effects are important determinants of 
conservation practice adoption. While their results were for broad 
geographic groupings and minimum tillage only, similar results were 
obtained here for smaller areas and the choice among conservation 
practices. Similarly, the findings of Miranowski et al. (91) and Lee 
and Stewart (79) that erosion potential and field type are important 
determinants of conservation practice adoption are extended. Land 
class and erosion rate are significant determinants of which prac­
tice is adopted given that adoption occurs. While effects differ by 
region, the better land classes are associated with larger rates of 
adoption of terracing and conservation tillage. The more erosive soils 
are linked to higher rates of conservation tillage adoption. This latter 
result would be expected up to a limit but continues throughout, which is 
troubling. Examination of the data reveals that while the great majority 
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Table 13. Probability of adoption of soil conservation practices by 
region for land class and farm size combinations 
Farm 
size- Region 
land 
class 
combin­
ation 
107 108 109 111 113 114 115 116 122 
Permanent Vegetative Cover Establishment 
Fill — —  .04 .04 .05 .27 .04 .08 .32 .27 
F1L2 .05 .12 .05 .17 .04 .18 .31 .30 
F1L3 .01 .06 .18 .06 .10 .05 .24 .29 .35 
F2L1 — —  .03 .02 .04 .22 .04 .03 .25 .17 
F2L2 .04 .06 .04 .21 .04 .10 .29 .26 
F2L3 .01 .05 .10 .05 .15 .04 .15 .30 .29 
F3L1 .02 .01 .04 .22 .03 .03 .24 .15 
F3L2 .03 .05 .04 .28 .03 .08 .29 .25 
F3L3 .04 .08 .05 .23 .04 .13 .33 .31 
F4L1 —  —  .02 .02 .03 .26 .03 .04 .24 .18 
F4L2 .03 .08 .03 .25 .03 .12 .26 .25 
F4L3 .01 .04 .13 .04 .18 .03 .18 .28 .28 
Permanent Vegetative Cover Improvement 
FlLl .01 .03 .46 .01 .01 .09 .08 
F1L2 — —  .08 .07 .77 .02 .08 .23 .24 
F1L3 — —  .21 .13 .87 .04 • .18 .37 .47 
F2L1 .01 .24 .04 .03 
F2L2 — —  .03 .04 .62 .01 .03 .14 .13 
F2L3 .07 .07 .78 .02 .07 .25 .25 
F3L1 .01 .13 .02 .02 
F3L2 .01 .02 .45 .01 .01 .08 .07 
F3L3 ~ — .04 .04 .65 .01 .04 .15 .14 
F4L1 .01 .23 — —  .03 .03 
F4L2 — —  — —  .03 .02 .59 .01 .03 .10 .10 
F4L3 — .08 .05 .75 .01 .07 .19 .20 
Terracing 
FlLl .99 .26 .94 .26 .01 .85 .14 .36 
F1L2 .99 .09 .78 .05 .60 .04 .12 
F1L3 .98 .06 .60 .02 .42 .02 .07 
F2L1 .99 .41 .98 .52 .02 .93 .27 .56 
F2L2 .99 .17 .91 .15 .01 .78 .09 .25 
F2L3 .99 .12 .82 — —  .06 . 66 .05 .15 
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Table 13. Continued 
Farm 
size- Region 
land 
class 
combin- 107 108 109 111 113 114 115 116 122 
ation 
F34 .99 .46 .98 — .64 .02 .94 .32 .62 
F3L2 .99 .20 .94 — —  .24 .01 .82 .12 .31 
F3L3 .99 .14 .87 .11 .72 .07 .20 
F4L1 .99 .28 .97 — —  .47 .01 .90 .19 .45 
F4L2 .99 .10 .89 —  —  .13 .71 .06 .18 
F4L3 .99 .07 .78 .05 .57 .04 .11 
Conservation Tillage 
FlLl . 70 mmmm .92 .02 .94 .06 .44 .30 
F1L2 —  —  .86 .01 .88 .01 .94 .14 .42 .34 
F1L3 .87 .01 .81 .01 .91 .15 .31 .10 
F2L1 .56 .94 .02 .94 .03 .43 .24 
F2L2 .79 .01 .92 .02 .94 .09 .49 .36 
F2L3 — —  .83 .01 .87 .01 .93 .12 .40 .31 
F3L1 .52 — —  .95 .02 .94 .03 .42 .22 
F3L2 — .77 .01 .94 .03 .95 .08 .52 .37 
F3L3 — .81 .01 .91 .02 .94 .11 .46 .35 
F4L1 — —  .69 —  —  .96 .03 .96 .06 .54 .34 
F4L2 .87 .01 .94 .03 .97 .15 .58 .46 
F4L3 .89 .01 .91 .02 .95 .18 .50 .41 
Ill 
of observations are on land eroding at less than 15 tons per acre per 
year, several very large erosion rates (>600) are included. Surprising­
ly, conservation tillage is the practice used on these soils. This may 
be sufficient to yield the results above. While Lee and Stewart (79) 
found farm size to be positively associated with minimum tillage adop­
tion, Miranowski et al. (91) found a negative relationship. The results 
here indicate that farm size is a significant determinant of which prac­
tice is adopted. Smaller farms are likely to have adoption patterns 
which differ from larger farms. 
Farmers of small tracts are less likely to adopt minimum tillage 
than are larger farmers—a finding which tends to support the results 
obtained by Lee and Stewart. However, results do not allow a complete 
comparison since only adopters are considered here. Indeed, smaller 
farms are likely to be associated with higher rates of adoption of 
permanent vegetative cover than are larger farms. The net result could 
be a higher or lower rate of adoption of conservation practices in 
general. 
Policy Implications and Limitations 
If the adoption of particular practices is desired, then several 
policy implications arise from these findings. Expanded use of con­
servation practices can be obtained by focusing on particular major 
land resource areas. Permanent vegetative cover practices are most 
likely to be adopted on the rolling hills of western Iowa, southern 
Iowa, northern Missouri, and the Central Mississippi Valley (MLRAs 107, 
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109, 115). Conservation tillage is the preferred practice in central 
Iowa and Illinois, Indiana and Ohio, where soils are gently sloping 
and cropland predominates. Increased use of conservation practices will 
likely follow these patterns. Attempting to increase the usage in a 
cross compliance program or a best management practice may not be an 
effective use of funds. The practices, as shown in Chapter V, are 
linked with the value of productivity being saved so that constraints 
on which practice is to be used may result in less valuable soils being 
conserved. 
Within a given region, the adoption rate can be increased or de­
creased by focusing on operators with particular soil classes and farm 
sizes. In general, soils in the better land classes are more likely to 
be associated with adoption of terracing and conservation tillage and 
less likely to be treated with permanent vegetative cover practices. 
Farmers with small farms (i.e., less than 100 acres) are less likely to 
adopt terracing or conservation tillage and more likely to use permanent 
vegetative cover practices than are those with larger farms. Expanded 
use of terracing or conservation tillage will require that larger subsi­
dies be given to those with small farms and poorer soils than those with 
larger farms and/or better soils if equal rates of adoption are desired. 
Increases in the prepractice erosion rate increase the likelihood 
of choosing conservation tillage over the other practices and increases 
the probability of adopting permanent vegetative cover practices over 
terracing. Evidently, terracing is not viewed as an efficient control 
measure on the more erosive soils. These results may be somewhat biased 
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due to a few observations on extremely erosive soils. 
The model results indicate that cost sharing has not had a signifi­
cant impact on which practice is used. Wider variation of subsidy rates 
would be required to increase usage of particular practices on this 
basis. 
Thus, the differences in adoption rates due to regional effects 
(land use, climate, topography, soil groups), soil classes, farm size and 
erosion rate provide policy makers with the opportunity to enhance pro­
gram effectiveness by modifying the approach depending on characteristics 
of the target group. 
However, the extent of adoption in the adoption model is uncertain. 
The probability of adopting a particular practice in a particular area 
may be quite small but given that adoption occurs, the practice may be 
applied to a large number of acres. Therefore, targeting funds here may 
be as effective as making funds available in an area where the probabil­
ity of adoption is greater but less area is covered. 
The model above examines the adoption decision as a function of a 
limited number of variables. Undoubtedly the decision is based on 
factors other than those in the model—most of which are linked to soil 
characteristics. Education, experience, tenure status, risk attitudes 
and income are all likely to play a part in the decision-making process. 
The bias associated with excluded variables depends upon their correla­
tion with the included variables. Some bias is therefore likely. 
If more information was available on nonadopters, then it would be 
possible to more thoroughly model the adoption decision using a limited 
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dependent variable technique such as Tobit analysis. In the absence 
of such information, it might be possible to extend the present analy­
sis to analyze determinants of soil savings given adoption of particu­
lar practices. 
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CHAPTER VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The purpose of this study has been to examine the efficiency with 
which investments in soil conservation are made. The efficiency issue 
includes the determination of the proper role of government, the optimal 
amount of conservation and an accurate measure of conservation benefits. 
The determination of which conservation practice is most beneficial is 
also required. This chapter includes a brief summary of the most im­
portant points developed in the research and the attendant conclusions. 
Justification of the Research 
Chapter II contains a review of the literature of soil formation, 
soil erosion, and soil conservation. The literature indicates that 
while soil formation does occur, much remains to be learned about the 
process. Recent advances in measuring techniques, such as the Universal 
Soil Loss and Wind Erosion Equations, have increased awareness of the 
magnitude of soil movement but significant gaps in our knowledge of 
soil loss remain. Furthermore, the impact of changes in the soil re­
source on soil productivity is not yet well-understood. Present toler­
able levels of erosion (T-values) are based on a few, dated, unreliable 
assumptions. 
Nevertheless, government has been involved in soil conservation 
efforts, using the measurement techniques and the T-values presently 
available as the basis for policy decisions. The proper role of govern­
ment is not easily determined since both allocative and distributive 
questions are involved. Welfare economics suggests that the pareto 
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efficiency criterion be used. Although the value judgments required 
are not easily defended, the efficiency concept is useful in policy 
analysis and can be used in conjunction with soil conservation policy. 
The possible reasons government might wish to invest in soil con­
servation arise from market failures leading to inefficient resource 
use. Externalities, inadequate markets or constraints on individuals 
can give rise to inefficient use of the soil resource. Government 
programs ostensibly remedy such market failures but are not without 
problems. Analysis of government conservation programs has shown the 
need to increase their effectiveness. Constraints on government con­
servation funds have also forced policy makers to consider how best 
to use the available funds. A recent suggestion to improve govern­
mental efforts is to target funds to critical areas. The determination 
of critical areas has been based on such criteria as the amount and 
extent of soil loss, the expected results, willingness of farmers to 
participate in a program, the effect of erosion on productivity, off-
site damages, and other social and economic conditions. The severity 
of erosion as measured in tons per acre per year has dominated and be­
come the major determinant of which areas receive targeting funds. 
Program evaluations have used this same measure to assess cost effec­
tiveness. Such an approach assumes all soils are equally productive 
and yield equal amounts of offsite damages. One ton of soil is the 
same as any other ton. Since this is not likely to be the case, there 
is a need for economic criteria to determine which areas should receive 
scarce conservation funds. 
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The need for a more accurate measure of erosion-induced damages 
is apparent. Current research has taken several tracks. One approach 
has been to estimate the amount of soil leaving the field at current 
erosion rates, extrapolate the amount into the future, and then deter­
mine the amount of soil left at the end of the period and its productive 
potential. A comparison with present production levels shows the re­
duction in yields expected. A second, relatively recent, method at­
tempts to relate soil characteristics to yields, then shows how yields 
change as erosion alters soil characteristics. Both methods have 
focused attention on the consequences of soil movement and provide 
information which could be used to develop a measure of productivity 
loss if particular crops grow in specific areas for a lengthy period of 
time. However, more adequate economic criteria can be developed to 
guide targeting efforts. The criteria are developed in an economic 
model and allow valuing the benefits of conservation. Empirical results 
from Iowa and the Corn Belt are used to show the differences in soil 
conservation values and the implications for targeting. 
The Economic Model and its Application 
Optimal decision rules for soil use are initially developed from 
a static profit maximizing model. The economic rationale for targeting 
requires funds be invested in those inputs (practices) where the 
marginal value product to input price ratio is the greatest. The dif­
ference in societal and private optima is shown to be a measure of 
market failure. An intertemporal model is then developed to include 
the effects of time since erosion in the present has effects on future 
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time periods. Dynamic optima are different from static results since 
effects on future time periods must be considered. When soil erosion 
and conservation practices are considered, optimality requires the 
marginal cost of the practice be equal to the marginal benefits from 
reduced erosion. Measures of marginal costs and marginal products 
are calculated for a sample of Corn Belt farmers and are used to 
estimate implicit soil prices. The difference between societal and 
private prices is interpreted as a measure of the offsite costs of 
erosion. It is shown that implicit soil prices are measures of the 
value of soil productivity at the margin. These prices decrease with 
the erosion rate and vary across regions. Areas with abundant soil or 
low productive soils generally have the lowest soil values. Higher 
soil values are associated with areas of highly productive thin soils 
or moderately thick and erosive soils. The calculated soil values 
can be used on a state, regional or national level to improve the 
efficiency with which conservation investments are made by targeting 
such investments to areas with the largest returns per dollar spent. 
The choice of which conservation practice to adopt was examined 
for insights into further methods of improving targeting. Past studies 
have considered the adopt-not adopt decision without developing the 
theoretical foundation for such models. The underlying choice theory 
and estimation procedures are examined. Given that adoption occurs, 
the choice of practice used is related to regional, soil class, farm 
size, and erosion rate characteristics. The findings regarding the 
effects of these variables on choice reinforce the findings of previous 
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studies. Region and farm size were previously found to affect the 
adopt-not adopt decision and are found to also be important determi­
nants of which practice is used given adoption. Smaller farms adopt 
less capital intensive practices. Terracing and conservation tillage 
are more likely to be used on the better land. Cost sharing was not 
found to be a significant determinant of choice. The results suggest 
that increased use of particular practices can be obtained by focusing 
on farms of a particular size with specific soil classes and in certain 
areas. If cost sharing is to be a determinant of practice usage, a 
wider variation in subsidy levels is necessary. Attempting to increase 
the level of usage of a particular practice in a region may not be an 
effective use of funds if the practice is not readily adopted on soils 
in that area. Best management practices arid cross compliance require­
ments should thus be chosen with care. 
Conclusions and Future Research Efforts 
This study has shown that economic criteria can be used to in­
crease the efficiency with which government conservation investments 
are made. It is also possible to find measures of conservation bene­
fits. The use of economic criteria provides policy makers with informa­
tion necessary to target conservation assistance to particular areas 
and withstand political pressures that dilute program effectiveness. 
While the information is useful, a few caveats are in order. 
The implicit soil values obtained in the empirical analysis are 
based on the assumption that farmers are economically rational. A 
119 
farmer who adopts conservation practices that are uneconomical because 
he believes it is the right thing to do would lead to over-valuation 
of the soil. Similarly, if farmers fail to invest in sufficient con­
servation, the implicit prices are underestimates of conservation 
benefits. If a large number of one type of farmer lives in a particular 
area, the results obtained above will be biased. 
Policy recommendations are based on the value of soil in agri­
cultural production. The results indicate that relative values of soils 
in different areas are the same from both social and private points of 
view—at least in the region considered. Other regions might have 
variations in offsite costs which offset productivity values so that 
targeting based on societal values differs from that based on private 
values. 
The adoption model does not consider the extent of adoption but 
only the likelihood a practice is chosen. Although the likelihood may 
be small, if the area treated is quite large, then subsidizing such a 
practice may be as effective as subsidizing a practice that has a 
higher probability of adoption but is used on a smaller area. 
Finally, the results are based on a sample of conservation practice 
users who receive government subsidies. The results may be generalized 
to other such users, but if those not receiving subsidies differ signifi­
cantly from the sample group, the results may not hold for the entire 
population. Additionally, the nature of the sample may mean results 
cannot be generalized to the major land resource areas as done here. 
Several issues can be considered further in light of this research. 
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The scope of the study could be broadened to determine implicit con­
servation prices in other parts of the United States. Where accurate 
measures of offaite costs due to agricultural related soil erosion are 
available, such information could be compared to the estimates arising 
in the model. The size of subsidy could then be evaluated. 
It would also be possible to use the procedure developed here to 
estimate implicit prices of other unpriced or inaccurately priced re­
sources. Irrigation water would be such a resource. Policy implications 
regarding the efficiency of government funding of water projects would 
be forthcoming. 
The choice of practice modeling is relevant to the adoption of 
other agriculture technologies that are not simultaneously linked to 
yet other practices. Such an approach might be used to examine the 
effect of various farmer characteristics on the choice of the type of 
tractor to purchase, the kind of irrigation technology to employ, or 
the selection of a financial institution with which to do business. 
121 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Allee, David J. "Implementation of RCA: A Problem Accommodating 
Economics in Soil and Water Conservation." In Soil Conserva­
tion Policies, Institutions and Incentives, pp. 93-108. Edited 
by Harold G. Halcrow, Earl 0. Heady and Melvin L. Cotner. 
Ankeny: Soil Conservation Society of America, 1982. 
Andrews, Richard N. L. "Values Analysis in Environmental Policy." 
In Environmental Policy Formation, pp. 137-148. Edited by 
Dean E. Mann. Lexington; Lexington Books, 1981. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. "Criteria for Social Investment." In Economics 
of the Environment, pp. 409-421. Edited by Robert Dorfman 
and Nancy S. Dorfman. New York: W. W. Norton & Company Inc., 
1977. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. "The Organization of Economic Activity: Issues 
Pertinent to the Choice of Market Versus Nonmarket Allocation." 
In Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis, pp. 59-73. Edited 
by Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis. Chicago: Markham 
Publishing Company, 1970. 
Arrow, Kenneth J. and Kurz, Mordecai, Public Investment, The Rate 
of Return, and Optimal Fiscal Policy. Baltimore : The Johns 
Hopkins Press, 1969. 
Atkinson, Anthony B. and Stiglitz, Joseph E. Lectures on Public 
Economics. New York: McGraw-Hill Inc., 1980. 
Austin, M. E. Land Resource Regions and Major Land Resource 
Areas of the United States. Agricultural Handbook No. 296. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Washington, D.C.: U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1963. 
Barlow, Tom. "Three-Quarters of the Conservation Job Not Being 
Done." In Soil Conservation Policies : An Assessment, pp. 
128-132. Ankeny: Soil Conservation Society of America, 1979. 
Batie, Sandra S. "Policies, Institutions and Incentives for Soil 
Conservation." In Soil Conservation Policies, Institutions 
and Incentives, pp. 25-40. Edited by Harold G. Halcrow, 
Earl 0. Heady and Melvin L. Cotner. Ankeny: Soil Conserva­
tion Society of America, 1982. 
122 
10. Bâtie, Sandra S. and Healy, Robert G. "American Agriculture as a 
Strategic Resource: The Past and the Future." In The Future 
of American Agriculture as ^  Strategic Resource, pp. 1-40. 
Edited by Sandra S. Bâtie and Robert G. Healy. Washington, 
D.C.: Conservation Foundation, 1980. 
11. Baumol, William J. Welfare Economics and the Theory of the State. 
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1965. 
12. Baumol, William J. and Gates, Wallace E. The Theory of Environ­
mental Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall Inc., 
1975. 
13. Bennett, Hugh H. and Chapline, W. R. Soil Erosion; A National 
Menace. Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1928. 
14. Birch, AlfredL. "Offsite Benefits from Soil Conservation: A 
Methodological and Distributional Investigation." Unpublished 
Ph.D. dissertation. East Lansing: Michigan State University, 
1981. 
15. Boron, Donald. Land Ownership Characteristics and Investment in 
Soil Conservation. U.S. Department of Agriculture ESS Staff 
Report No. AGES810911. Washington, D.C., 1981. 
16. Brewer, Michael F. and Boxley, Robert F. "Agricultural Land: 
Adequacy of Acres, Concepts and Information." American 
Journal of Agricultural Economics 63 (December 1981): 879-887. 
17. Bromley, Daniel. "Economics and Public Decisions: Roles of the 
State and Issues in Economic Evaluation." Journal of Economic 
Issues 10 (December 1976): 811-838. 
18. Brubaker, Sterling. "Agricultural Land: Policy Issues and Alterna­
tives." In The Cropland Crisis—Myth or Reality, pp. 197-224. 
Edited by Pierre R. Crosson. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins 
University Press, 1982. 
19. Brubaker, Sterling and Castle, Emery N. "Alternative Policies and 
Strategies to Achieve Soil Conservation." In Soil Conserva­
tion Policies, Institutions and Incentives, pp. 302-314. 
Edited by Harold G. Halcrow. Earl 0. Heady and Melvin L. 
Cotner. Ankeny: Soil Conservation Society of America, 1982. 
20. Bunce, Arthur F. The Economics of Soil Conservation. Ames : 
Iowa State University Press, 1945. 
123 
21. Burt, Oscar R. "Farm Level Impacts of Soil Conservation in the 
Palouse Area of the Northwest." American Journal of Agri­
cultural Economics 63 (February 1981): 83-92. 
22. Burt, Oscar R.; and Cummings, Ronald G. "Natural Resource Manage­
ment, the Steady State, and Approximately Optimal Decision 
Rules." Land Economics 53 (February 1977): 1-22. 
23. Castle, E. N. "Property Rights and the Political Economy of Re­
source Scarcity." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
60 (February 1978): 1-9. 
24. Castle, Emergy N.; Kelso, Maurice M.; Stevens, Joe B.; and Stoevener, 
Herbert H. "Natural Resource Economics, 1946-1975." In A 
Survey of Agricultural Economics Literature, Volume 3, pp. 
393-500. Edited by Lee R. Martin. Minneapolis: University 
of Minnesota Press, 1981. 
25. Ciriacy-Wantrup, S. V. "Benefit-Cost Analysis and Public Resource 
Development." In Economics and Public Policy in Water Resource 
Development, pp. 9-21. Edited by S. C. Smith and E. N. Castle. 
Ames: Iowa State University Press, 1964. 
26. Ciriacy-Wantrup, S. V. Resource Conservation Economics and Poli­
cies. Davis: University of California Experiment Station, 
1968. 
27. Clark, Colin W. Mathematical Bioeconomics; The Optimal Management 
of Renewable Resources. New York: John Wiley & Sons, 1976. 
28. Comptroller General of the U.S. Opportunities for Increasing the 
Effectiveness of the Conservation Operations Program. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1969. 
29. Comptroller General of the U.S. Greater Conservation Benefits 
Could Be Attained Under the Rural Environmental Assistance 
Program. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 
1972. 
30. Comptroller General of the U.S. Progress in Meeting Important 
Obi ectives of the Great Plains Conservation Program Could 
Be Improved. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1973. 
31. Comptroller General of the U.S. National Water Quality Goals Can­
not be Attained Without More Attention to Pollution from Dif­
fused or 'Nonpoint' Sources. Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, 1977. 
124 
32. Comptroller General of the U.S. To Protect Tomorrow's Food Supply, 
Soil Conservation Needs Priority Attention. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1977. 
33. Comptroller General of the U.S. A Framework and Checklist for 
Evaluating Soil and Water Conservation Programs. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1980. 
34. Congress of the United States. Office of Technology Assessment. 
Impacts of Technology on U.S. Cropland and Rangeland Pro-
ductivity. Washington, B.C.: U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1982. 
35. Cook, Ken. "Ah, for the Simple Life." Journal of Soil and Water 
Conservation 37 (May-June 1982): 154-156. 
36. Cook, Ken. "Great Plains Study Suspended." Journal of Soil and 
Water Conservation 37 (July-August 1982): 216. 
37. Cook, Ken. "Soil Loss: A Question of Values." Journal of Soil 
and Water Conservation 37 (March-April 1982): 89-92. 
38. Crosson, Pierre. "A Perspective on the Appropriate Role of the 
Public Sector in Dealing with the Uncertainties of the Im­
pacts of Soil Loss." Paper presented at the AAEA Summer 
Meetings, Logan, Utah, August 2, 1982. 
39. Crosson, Pierre R. "Future Economic and Environmental Costs of 
Agricultural Land." In The Cropland Crisis—Myth or Reality, 
pp. 165-196. Edited by Pierre R. Crosson. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 
40. Crosson, Pierre R. "The Longterm Adequacy of Agricultural Land in 
the United States." In The Cropland Crisis—Myth or Reality, 
pp. 1-22. Edited by Pierre R. Crosson. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1982. 
41. Crosson, Pierre R.; and Brubaker, Sterling. Resource and Environ­
mental Effects of U.S. Agriculture. Washington, D.C.: Re­
sources for the Future, 1982. 
42. Crosson, Pierre R.; and Miranowski, John M. "Soil Protection; 
Why, By Whom, and For Whom." Journal of Soil and Water Con­
servation 37 (January-February 1982): 27-29. 
43. Dasgupta, P. S.; and Heal, G. M. Economic Theory and Exhaustible 
Resources. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979. 
125 
44. Davenport, Charles; Boehlje, Michael D.; and David, H. B. The 
Effects of Tax Policy on American Agriculture. AER-480. U.S. 
Department of Agriculture. February, 1982. 
45. Davis, Otto A.; and Kamien, Morton I. "Externalities, Information 
and Alternative Collection Action." In Public Expenditures 
and Policy Analysis, pp. 74-95. Edited by Robert H. Haveman 
and Julius Margolis. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 
1970. 
46. Dechant, Tony T. "Conserving Cropland Resources and Enhancing 
Soil Fertility and Productivity." In Soil Conservation 
Policies ; An Assessment, pp. 113-119. Ankeny: Soil Conserva­
tion Society of America, 1979. 
47. Dudek, Daniel J.; and Horner, Gerald L. "Return Flow Control Policy 
and Income Distribution Among Irrigators." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 63 (August 1981): 438-446. 
48. Easter, K. William; and Cotner, Melvin L. "Evaluation of Current 
Soil Conservation Strategies." In Soil Conservation Policies, 
Institutions and Incentives, pp. 283-301. Edited by Harold G. 
Halcrow, Earl 0. Heady and Melvin L. Cotner. Ankeny: Soil 
Conservation Society of America, 1982. 
49. Eleveld, Bartelt; and Halcrow, Harold G. "How Much Soil Conserva­
tion is Optimum for Society?" In Soil Conservation Policies, 
Institutions and Incentives, pp. 233-250. Edited by Harold G. 
Halcrow, Earl 0. Heady and Melvin L. Cotner. Ankeny: Soil 
Conservation Society of America, 1982. 
50. Ervin, Christine A.; and Ervin, David E. "Factors Affecting the 
Use of Soil Conservation Practices; Hypotheses, Evidence, 
and Policy Implications." Land Economics 58 (August 1982): 
277-292. 
51. Feder, Gershon. Adoption of Agricultural Innovations in Developing 
Countries: A Survey. World Bank Staff Working Paper No. 
444. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank, 1981, 
52. Fischel, William A. "The Urbanization of Agricultural Land: A 
Review of the National Agricultural Lands Study." Land 
Economics 58 (May 1982): 236-259. 
53. Fisher, Anthony C. Resource and Environmental Economics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981. 
54. Friedman, Milton; and Friedman, Rose. Free to Choose. New York: 
Harcourt, Brace, Jovanovich, Inc., 1980. 
126 
55. Frohberg, Klaus K. ; and S wans on, E. R. A Method for Determining 
the Optimal Rate of Soil Erosion. Agricultural Economics 
Research Report 161. Urbana: University of Illinois, 1976. 
56. Gilder, George. Wealth and Poverty. New York: Basic Books, 1981. 
57. Giltmeier, James W. "What Priority Conservation?" Journal of Soil 
and Water Conservation 37 (September-October 1982): 250-251. 
58. Haefele, Edwin. Representative Government and Environmental Manage­
ment. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973. 
59. Hall, G. F.; Daniels, R. B.; and Foss, F. E. "Rate of Soil Forma­
tion and Renewal in the USA." In Determinants of Soil Toler­
ance, pp. 23-40. Madison: Soil Science Society of America, 
1982. 
60. Haveman, Robert H. The Economics of the Public Sector. New York: 
New York: John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1970. 
61. Haveman, Robert H. "Efficiency and Equity in Natural Resource and 
Environmental Policy." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 55 (December 1977): 868-878. 
62. Haveman, Robert H. "Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis: An 
Overview." In Public Expenditures and Policy Analysis, pp. 
1-18. Edited by Robert H. Haveman and Julius Margolis. 
Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1970. 
63. Hays, Samuel P. Conservation and the Gospel of Efficiency: The 
Progressive Conservation Movement, 1890-1920. Baltimore: The 
Johns Hopkins Press, 1959. 
64. Heady, Earl 0. "The Adequacy of Agricultural Land: A Demand-Supply 
Perspective." In The Cropland Crisis—Myth or Reality, pp. 
23-56. Edited by Pierre R. Crosson. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1982. 
65. Heady, Earl 0. Economics of Agricultural Production and Resource 
Use. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1952. 
66. Heady, Earl 0. "Efficiency in Public Soil Conservation Programs." 
The Journal of Political Economy 59 (February 1951): 47-61. 
67. Heady, Earl 0. "Some Fundamentals of Conservation Economics and 
Policy." Journal of Farm Economics 32 (November 1950): 1182-
1195. 
68. Henderson, James M. ; and Quandt, Richard E. Microeconomic Theory. 
New York: McGraw-Hill Book Company, 1971. 
69 
70 
71 
72 
73, 
74, 
75. 
76. 
77. 
78. 
79. 
80. 
127 
Holding, Brian. "List of Available Publications." Ames: lowa 
State University Center for Agricultural and Rural Develop­
ment, 1983. 
Hotelling, H. "The Economics of Exhaustible Resources." Journal 
of Political Economy 39 (April 1931): 137-175. 
Howe, Charles W. Natural Resource Economics. New York: John 
Wiley & Sons, 1979. 
Judge, George G.; Griffiths, William E.; Hill, R. Carter; and Lee, 
Tsoung-Chao. The Theory and Practice of Econometrics. New 
York: John Wiley and Sons, 1980. 
Just, Richard E.; Hueth, Darrell L.; and Schmitz, Andrew. Applied 
Welfare Economics and Public Policy. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: 
Prentice-Hall, Inc., 1982. 
Krutilla, John V. "Welfare Aspects of Benefit-Cost Analysis." 
Journal of Political Economy 69 (February 1961): 226-235, 
Ladd, George. A Mark Twainian View of Consumer Surplus. Depart­
ment of Economics Staff Paper No. 110. Ames: Iowa State 
University, 1981. 
Langdale, G. W.; and Shrader, W. D. "Soil Erosion Effects on Soil 
Productivity of Cultivated Cropland." In Determinants of Soil 
Tolerance, pp. 41-52. Madison: Soil Science Society of America, 
1982. 
Larson, W. E.; Pierce, F. J.; and Dowdy, R. H. "The Threat of Soil 
Erosion to Long-Term Crop Production." Science 119 (4 February 
1983): 458-465. 
Lee, Linda K. "The Impact of Land Ownership Factors on Soil 
Conservation." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 62 
(December, 1980): 1070-1076. 
Lee, Linda K.; and Stewart, William H. "Land Ownership and the 
Adoption of Minimum Tillage." American Journal of Agricultural 
Economics 65 (May 1983): 256-264. 
Leman, Christopher. "Political Dilemmas in Evaluating and Budgeting 
Soil Conservation Programs: The RCA Process." In Soil Con­
servation Policies, Institutions and Incentives, pp. 47-88. 
Edited by Harold G. Halcrow. Earl 0. Heady and Mel vin L. Cotner. 
Ankeny: Soil Conservation Society of America. 
128 
81. Léman, Christopher; and Miranowski, John. "How Farm Soil is Slid­
ing into the Pork Barrel." The Christian Science Monitor, 
November 3, 1982. 
82. Logan, Terry J. "Improved Criteria for Developing Soil Loss 
Tolerance Levels for Cropland." In Determinants of Soil 
Tolerance, pp. 131-138. Madison: Soil Science Society of 
America, 1982. 
83. Maddala, G. S. Limited Dependent and Qualitative Variables in 
Econometrics. New York: Cambridge University Press, 1983. 
84. Mayer, Leo V. "Farm Exports and Soil Conservation." In Food Policy 
and Farm Programs, pp. 99-111. Edited by Don Hadwiger and 
Ross Talbot. New York: Academy of Political Science, 1982. 
85. McConnell, Kenneth E. "An Economic Model of Soil Conservation." 
American Journal of Agricultural Economics 65 (February 1983): 
82-89. 
86. McCormack, D. E.; Young, K. K.; and Kimberlin, L. W. "Current 
Criteria for Determining Soil Loss Tolerance." In Determinants 
of Soil Tolerance, pp. 95-112. Madison: Soil Science Society 
of America, 1982. 
87. McFadden, Daniel. "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice 
Behavior." In Frontiers in Econometrics, pp. 105-142. Edited 
by Paul Zarembka. New York: Academic Press, 1974. 
88. McLaughlin, Charles. "Current Soil Conservation Policies and Insti­
tutions: A Farmer's Assessment." In Soil Conservation Poli­
cies : An Assessment. pp. 75-78. Ankeny: Soil Conservation 
Society of America, 1979. 
89. Melichar, Emanuel. "Capital Gains Versus Current Income in the 
Farming Sector." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
61 (December 1979): 1085-1092. 
90. Meyers, Peter C. "Federal Conservation Programs in Transition." 
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 37 (September-October 
1982): 266-268. 
91. Miranowski, J. A.; Monson, M. S.; Shortle, J. S.; and Zinser, L. D. 
Effect of Agricultural Land Use Practices on Stream Water 
Quality : Economic Analysis. Final Report, Iowa State 
Cooperative Agreement, No. CR807087-01, 1982. 
92. Mishan, E. J. Introduction to Normative Economics. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1981. 
129 
93. Mishan, E. J. "The Postwar Literature on Externalities: An 
Interpretative Essay." Journal of Economic Literature 9 
(March 1978): 1-28. 
94. Mittelhammer, Ron C. ; Matulich, Scott C.; and Bushaw, D. "On 
Implicit Forms of Multiproduct-Multifactor Production Func­
tions American Journal of Agricultural Economics 63 (Feb­
ruary 1981): 164-168. 
95. Morgan, Robert J. Soil Conservation; Thirty Years of the New 
Decentralization. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins Press, 1965. 
96. Mueller, Dennis C. Public Choice. New York: Cambridge University 
Press, 1979. 
97. Ogg, Clayton; and Miller, Arnold. "Minimizing Erosion on Culti­
vated Land: Concentration of Erosion Problems and the 
Effectiveness of Conservation Practices." Policy Research 
Notes (August 1981): 5-12. 
98. Ogg, Clayton W. ; Christensen, Lee A. ; and Heimlich, Ralph E. 
Economics of Water Quality in Agriculture—A Literature Review. 
U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service-58, 
1979. 
99. Ogg, Clayton W. ; Johnson, James D. ; and Clayton, Kenneth C. 
"Policy Options for Targeting Soil Conservation Expenditures." 
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 37 (March-April 1982): 
68-72. 
100. Page, Talbot. Conservation and Economic Efficiency; An Approach 
to Materials Policy. Baltimore; Johns Hopkins University 
Press, 1977. 
101. Pierce, F. J.; Larson, W. E. ; Dowdy, R. H. ; and Graham, W. P. 
"Productivity of Soils: Assessing Long-Term Changes Due to 
Erosion." Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 38 (January-
February 1983): 39-44. 
102. Pigou, A. C. The Economics of Welfare. London: Macmillan, 1932. 
103. Pimentai, D.; Terhune, E. C.; Dyson-Hudson, R.; Rochereau, S.; 
S amis, R. ; Smith, E. A. ; Denman, D. ; Reifschneider, D. ; and 
Shepard, M. "Land Degradation: Effects on Food and Energy 
Resources." Science 194 (8 October 1976); 149-155. 
104. Randall, A. "Market Solutions to Externality Problems: Theory 
and Practice." American Journal of Agricultural Economics 
54 (February 1972): 175-183. 
130 
105. Randall, Alan. "Policy Science in the Land-Grant Complex: A 
Perspective on Natural Resource Economics." Southern Journal 
of Agricultural Economics 14 (July 1982): 85-92. 
106. Rasmussen, Wayne D. "History of Soil Conservation, Institutions 
and Incentives." In Soil Conservation Policies. Institutions 
and Incentives, pp. 3-18. Edited by Harold G. Halcrow, Earl 
0. Heady and Melvin L. Cotner. Ankeny: Soil Conservation 
Society of America, 1982. 
107. Raup, Philip M. "An Agricultural Critique of the National Agri­
cultural Lands Study." Land Economics 58 (May 1982): 260-274. 
108. Rausser, Gordon C. "Economics of Soil Conservation from the 
Farmer's Perspective; Discussion." American Journal of 
Agricultural Economics 62 (December 1980): 1093-1094. 
109. Robbins, Lionel. "Economics and Political Economy." American 
Economic Review 71 (May 1981): 1-10. 
110. Robinson, A. R. "Sediment Yield as a Function of Upstream Ero­
sion." In Universal Soil Loss Equation: Past, Present and 
the Future, pp. 7-16. Madison: Soil Science Society of 
America, 1979. 
111. Sampson, R. Neil. Farmland or Wasteland—A Time to Choose. 
Emmaus, PA: Rodale Press, 1981. 
112. Schmid, A. Allan. Property, Power, and Public Choice—An Inquiry 
into Law and Economics. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1978. 
113. Schultz, Theodore W. "The Dynamics of Soil Erosion in the United 
States." Paper presented at the Conference on Soil Conserva­
tion, Agricultural Council of America, Washington, D.C., 
March 17, 1982. 
114. Schultze, Charles L. "The Role and Responsibilities of the 
Economist in Government." American Economic Review 72 (May 
1982): 62-66. 
115. Schumm, S. A.; and Harvey, M. D. "Natural Erosion in the USA." 
In Determinants of Soil Tolerance, pp. 15-22. Madison: Soil 
Science Society of America, 1982. 
116. Seitz, W. D.; Gardner, D. M.; Gove, S. K.; Gunterman, K. L.; 
Karr, J. B.; Spitze, R. C. F.; Swanson, E. R.; Taylor, C. R.; 
Uchtman, D. L.; and Van Es, J. C. Alternative Policies for 
Controlling Nonpoint Agricultural Sources of Water Pollution. 
Athens, GA: Environmental Protection Agency, 1978. 
131 
117. Shortle, James S. "Soil Depletion and Water Quality; A Case 
Study in the Conjunctive Management of Natural Resources." 
Unpublished Ph.D. dissertation. Ames: Iowa State University, 
1981. 
118. Skidmore, E. L.; and Woodruff, N. P. Wind Erosion Forces in the 
United States and Their Use in Predicting Soil Loss. Agri­
cultural Handbook No. 346. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1968. 
119. Steiner, Peter 0. Public Expenditure Budgeting. Washington, D.C.: 
The Brookings Institution, 1969. 
120. Stigler, G. J. "The Economist and the State." American Economic 
Review 55 (May 1965): 1-18. 
121. Stiglitz, J. E. "A Neoclassical Analysis of the Economics of 
Natural Resources." In Scarcity and Growth Reconsidered, 
pp. 36-66. Edited by V. Kerry Smith. Baltimore: The Johns 
Hopkins University Press, 1979. 
122. Strohbehn, Roger. "Implementation of RCA: A Problem Accommodat­
ing Economics in Soil and Water Conservation—Discussion." In 
Soil Conservation Policies, Institutions and Incentives, pp. 
109-111. Edited by Harold G. Halcrow, Earl 0. Heady and 
Melvin L. Cotner. Ankeny: Soil Conservation Society of 
America, 1982. 
123. Swader, Frederick N. "Soil Productivity and the Future of American 
Agriculture." In The Future of American Agriculture as a 
Strategic Resource, pp. 79-115. Edited by Sandra S. Batie 
and Robert G. Healy. Washington, D.C.: Conservation Founda­
tion, 1980. 
124. Timmons, John F. "Agriculture's Natural Resource Base: Demand 
and Supply Interactions, Problems and Remedies." In Soil 
Conservation Policies; An Assessment, pp. 53-74. Ankeny; 
Soil Conservation Society of America, 1979. 
125. Timmons, John F.; and Amos, Orley M. Jr. "Economics of Soil Ero­
sion Control with Application to T Values." In Determinants 
of Soil Tolerance, pp. 139-153. Madison; Soil Science Society 
of America, 1982. 
126. U.S. Department of Agriculture. RCA Appraisal 1980: Part I. 
Soil, Water and Related Resources in the United States ; 
Status, Conditions, and Trends. Washington, D.C.; U.S. 
Government Printing Office, 1981. 
132 
127. U.S. Department of Agriculture. RCA Appraisal 1980; Part II. 
Soil, Water and Related Resources in the United States ; 
Analysis of Resource Trends. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Govern­
ment Printing Office, 1981. 
128. U.S. Department of Agriculture. RCA Program Report and Environ­
mental Impact Statement. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1981. 
129. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Agricultural Stabilization and 
Conservation Service. National Summary Evaluation of the 
Agricultural Conservation Program. Phase I. Washington, D.C.: 
U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981. 
130. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service. Budget, 
Fiscal Year 1983—Briefing Paper. 1982. 
131. U.S. Department Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation 
Service. Conservation Technical Assistance in Targeted 
Geographical Areas. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Print­
ing Office, 1982. 
132. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service. A 
Program Evaluation of the Great Plains Conservation Program. 
Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1974. 
133. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service. 
National Agricultural Lands Study Final Report. Washington, 
D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981. 
134. U.S. Department of Agriculture, Soil Conservation Service, 
Economics, Program Planning and Evaluation Staff. An Evalua­
tion of Selected Impacts of the Resource Conservation and 
Development Program. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government 
Printing Office, 1975. 
135. Unger, David G. "RCA; A New Approach to Conservation Policies 
and Programs." In Resource Constrained Economies ; The 
North American Dilemma, pp. 63-69. Ankeny: Soil Conserva­
tion Society of America, 1980. 
136. VanKooten, GerritC. "The Integration of Efficiency and Equity 
in Public Decision-Making: Theoretical Issues and Applica­
tions." Ph.D. Dissertation. Oregon State University, 1981. 
137. Wade, James C. ; and Heady, Earl 0. A National Model of Sediment 
and Water Quality; Various Impacts on American Agriculture. 
Ames: Iowa State University Center for Agriculture and 
Resource Development Report 67, 1976. 
133 
138. Walker, David L.; and Young, Douglas L. "A Perspective That 
Technology May Not Ease the Vulnerability of U.S. Agriculture 
to Erosion." Paper presented at the AAEA summer meetings, 
Logan, Utah, August 2, 1982. 
139. Wildavsky, Aaron. "The Political Economy of Efficiency." Public 
Administration Review 26 (1966): 292-310. 
140. Williams, J. R. ; Allmaras, R. R. ; Renard, K. G. ; Lyles, Leon; 
Moldenhauer, W. C.; Langdale, G. W.; Meyer, L. D. ; Rawls, 
W. J.; Darby, G.; Daniels, R. ; and Magelby, R. "Soil Ero­
sion Effects on Soil Productivity: A Research Perspective." 
Journal of Soil and Water Conservation 36 (January-February 
1982): 82-90. 
141. Wischmeier, W. H.; and Smith, D. D, Predicting Rainfall Erosion 
Losses—A Guide to Conservation Planning. Agricultural Hand­
book No. 537. Washington, D.C.; U.S. Government Printing 
Office, 1978. 
142. Yates, Douglas. Bureaucratic Democracy—The Search for Democracy 
and Efficiency in American Government. Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1982. 
143. Young, Gran R. Resource Regimes. Berkeley: University of 
California Press, 1982. 
134 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
I am appreciative of the support and encouragement of wy family 
in what has been a lengthy period of formal training. My wife, Susan, 
has been an able counselor and editor as well as a source of encourage­
ment. 
Special thanks are given to Dr. John A. Miranowski for his will­
ing assistance, insightful suggestions, and constructive criticism in 
the preparation of this dissertation. The helpful comments of Dr. Roy 
Adams, Dr. Neil Harl, Dr. Roy Hickman, and Dr. William Meyers are also 
gratefully acknowledged. 
I express my appreciation to the people of Iowa who are responsi­
ble for the pleasant environment at Iowa State University and the fund­
ing of the Agricultural Experiment Station which partially supported 
this research. The typing expertise of Carolyn Taylor was deeply 
appreciated. 
